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ARTICLE 
STATE OWNERSHIP 
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Mariana Pargendler*
 
 
State ownership of publicly traded corporations remains pervasive 
around the world and has been increasing in recent years.  Existing 
literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for 
corporate governance and performance at the firm level.  This Article, by 
contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether 
the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities 
on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. 
Drawing on historical experiments with government ownership in the 
United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict 
of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and 
regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of 
outside investor protection and efficiency.  It thus addresses a gap in the 
literature on the political economy of corporate governance by 
incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another 
mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership 
structures and legal investor protection.  Finally, this Article explores the 
promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of 
the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance 
environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations. 
 
 
 
*  Professor of Law, Fundação Getulio Vargas School of Law at São Paulo; Yale Law 
School, LL.M., J.S.D.; Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, LL.B., PhD. I am 
grateful to Diego Arguelhes, Ian Ayres, Paula Forgioni, José A.T. Guerreiro, Gillian 
Hadfield, Henry Hansmann, Ronald Hilbrecht, Nicholas Howson, Michael Klausner, Daniel 
Klerman, Judith Martins-Costa, Curtis Milhaupt, John Morley, Aldo Musacchio, Larry 
Ribstein, Mark Roe, Edward Rock, Roberta Romano, Bruno Salama, Natasha Salinas, 
Calixto Salomão Filho, Cesar Santolim, Mario Schapiro, Charles Whitehead, James 
Whitman, Carlos Zanini, and participants at the Fordham University School of Law’s 
Comparative Corporate Governance Distinguished Lecture Series, at the Harvard-Stanford 
International Junior Faculty Forum, and at the Columbia Law School-FGV Global Alliance 
Workshop for extremely helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article.  All errors 
are my own. 
2918 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 2918 
I.  THE STATE AS SHAREHOLDER:  A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ....... 2925 
A.  The United States .................................................................... 2925 
B.  Brazil ...................................................................................... 2932 
C.  China ...................................................................................... 2942 
D.  Continental Europe ................................................................ 2948 
1.  Italy .................................................................................. 2948 
2.  Germany ........................................................................... 2951 
3.  France ............................................................................... 2953 
II.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE WAVE  
  OF PRIVATIZATIONS ..................................................................... 2954 
III. ADDRESSING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ............................................. 2957 
A.  Ownership Strategies .............................................................. 2957 
1.  Privatization ..................................................................... 2958 
2.  Whole Ownership of SOEs .............................................. 2959 
3.  The State as Minority Shareholder................................... 2961 
B.  Legal Strategies ...................................................................... 2962 
1.  Dual Regulatory Regimes ................................................ 2962 
2.  Dual Regulatory Authorities ............................................ 2968 
a.  Dual Regulatory Authorities Within the Same State .. 2968 
b.  Federalism ................................................................. 2969 
c.  Private and Public Regulatory Authorities 
Within the Same State ............................................... 2970 
d.  Dualism Across Different Jurisdictions ..................... 2971 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 2973 
INTRODUCTION 
After two decades of privatizations and the emergence of an increasing—
though not quite conclusive—consensus on the comparative efficiency of 
private versus state ownership of business enterprise, the pendulum has 
swung in the opposite direction.  Although atypical in the United States,1 
state ownership of listed companies is pervasive and growing elsewhere in 
the world.  State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are now responsible for 
approximately one-fifth of global stock market value, which is more than 
two times the level observed just one decade ago.2
 
 1. LLOYD MUSOLF, UNCLE SAM’S PRIVATE, PROFITSEEKING CORPORATIONS:  COMSAT, 
FANNIE MAE, AMTRAK, AND CONRAIL 2 (1983) (“Mixed enterprises occupy a political and 
economic no-man’s-land in the United States, though they are regarded as unexceptional, 
even commonplace, in many parts of the world.”). 
  According to a recent 
survey, government-controlled firms account for about 80 percent of the 
 2. China Buys Up the World, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 2010, at 11. 
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market capitalization in China, 60 percent in Russia, and 35 percent in 
Brazil.3
There is a large body of literature exploring the potential inefficiencies of 
state control of enterprise, and a growing body of literature on the ways in 
which the law, and in particular corporate law, might be structured to limit 
those inefficiencies.  In this Article, I look at the other side of the problem:  
what is the effect of state ownership on the structure of corporate and 
capital markets law, not just as it applies to state-controlled firms but as it 
applies in general to firms that are entirely privately owned?  The latter 
issue is arguably as important as, or even more important than, the problem 
of controlling the inefficiencies of state ownership.  Nevertheless, it has 
been almost entirely neglected. 
 
Drawing on historical and comparative experiments with state ownership, 
this Article shows that government control of business corporations can 
have unintended consequences well beyond potential firm mismanagement 
if the state pursues political goals inconsistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization—the concern that dominates the large literature on the 
relative merits of public and private ownership.4  An important, but so far 
overlooked, byproduct of government ownership stems from the conflict of 
interest inherent in the state’s dual role as shareholder and corporate 
governance regulator.5
There is now a vast body of empirical literature underscoring the 
importance of legal investor protection to the development of capital 
markets around the world.  In particular, these works show a strong 
correlation among low levels of protection for minority shareholders, highly 
concentrated corporate control in the hands of the state and wealthy 
families, and underdeveloped capital markets.
  That is, where the state is a controlling shareholder 
of major business corporations, its interests as controller may come to 
dictate the content of general corporate laws to the detriment of both outside 
investor protection and efficiency. 
6
 
 3. The Company that Ruled the Waves, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2011, at 109. 
  However, a series of studies 
 4. For empirical studies discussing and evaluating these risks, see infra note 212.  
Following the 2008 bailouts, U.S. legal scholars warned that U.S. law does not adequately 
protect shareholders of government-controlled firms against such risks. See generally Marcel 
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 1293 (2011); see also J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.:  How the Bailout Reshapes 
Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 287, 326–44 (2010). 
 5. Although the focus here is on state shareholding and its implications for corporate 
governance regulation, other types of state investment (i.e., as a debtholder) may likewise 
raise conflicts with the state’s regulatory function.  For a recent example of the government’s 
conflicting goals as investor and regulator, see Caroline Salas & Jody Shenn, New York Fed 
Faces “Inherent Conflict” in Mortgage Buybacks, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/new-york-fed-faces-inherent-conflict-in-
seeking-to-recover-mortgage-loss.html (stating that the New York Fed’s attempt to recover 
taxpayer money employed in bailouts during the financial crisis may run counter to its 
mandate to promote the stability of the financial system). 
 6. For a few works representative of this extensive body of literature, see generally 
Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael 
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).  To be sure, the 
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on the political economy of corporate governance has demonstrated that the 
causal link between legal institutions, on the one hand, and corporate 
ownership structure and capital market development, on the other hand, is 
unlikely to be unidirectional.  While poor investor protection can 
discourage ownership dispersion and capital market development, 
concentrated shareholdings in the hands of powerful families may also 
generate strong political opposition to legal reforms providing for stronger 
minority shareholder rights.7
Yet the existing literature on the political economy of corporate 
governance focuses exclusively on private owners, managers, and workers 
as the relevant political constituents.
 
8
The recognition of the role of the government as shareholder in corporate 
law reform unveils another dimension of the well-known correlation 
between family and state control of corporate enterprise.
  Perhaps due to the relative scarcity of 
listed state-owned firms in the Anglo-American world (the source of a 
major part of these studies), the potential role of the state as a shareholder in 
corporate governance is left entirely out of the equation.  I argue that, by 
excluding this key political actor, conventional models have failed to 
adequately describe the political economy of the large, and recently 
growing, number of jurisdictions that boast a substantial number of mixed 
enterprises, here defined as corporations in which the government shares 
ownership with private investors. 
9
 
“antidirector rights index” used in these initial works proved to be faulty. See Holger 
Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467, 470, 477–83 
(2010) (finding numerous errors in the antidirector rights index that compromise the initial 
results obtained by the law-and-finance literature); see also Simeon Djankov et al., The Law 
and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430 (2008) (representing a more recent 
work that relies on an improved index). 
  The conventional 
interpretation of why family and state control appear in tandem is that, in a 
system of poor investor protection and high private benefits of control, 
controlling shareholders do not give away control for fear of subsequent 
expropriation.  Because robust capital markets fail to emerge in this context, 
only the state and wealthy families possess enough capital to invest in 
large-scale productive activity.  In fact, the very existence of state-owned 
 7. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 131 (1999) (arguing that “[a] 
country’s initial pattern of corporate structures influences the power that various interest 
groups have in the process producing corporate rules”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of 
Dispersed Ownership:  The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 80 (2001) (suggesting the existence of reverse causation between 
capital market development and legal investor protection, as “strong markets do create a 
demand for stronger legal rules”). 
 8. See, e.g., PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND 
CORPORATE CONTROL:  THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2005) 
(modeling governance outcomes based on the preferences of owners, managers, and 
workers). 
 9. See, e.g., Kathy Fogel, Oligarchic Family Control, Social Economic Outcomes, and 
the Quality of Government, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 603, 612 (2006) (finding that “[m]ore 
family control is associated with more [state-owned enterprises]”); La Porta et al., Corporate 
Ownership Around the World, supra note 6, at 511–13. 
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enterprises is partially justified by the failure of capital markets to provide 
financing for large firms to carry out socially beneficial projects.10
Nevertheless, reverse causation remains equally plausible.  For example, 
if state ownership serves as a substitute for capital markets, high levels of 
government ownership of enterprise may effectively “crowd out” the 
private sector.
 
11
Although this study mostly refers to the interests of “the state” as a 
unitary actor for the sake of simplicity, its argument does not depend on an 
entirely monolithic, and hence unrealistic, view of the state.  There are, to 
be sure, differing interests and powers within the state, often represented by 
competing government agencies, which might de facto diminish the state’s 
capacity to pursue its interests as a shareholder in a unitary manner and, in 
some cases, attenuate or even override the state’s conflicts of interest as 
shareholder and regulator.
  The goal of this Article is to underscore an important but 
so far overlooked channel for reverse causation:  the negative influence of 
the role of the government as a controlling shareholder on the levels of a 
country’s legal investor protection and, consequently, on its capital market 
development. 
12
Various factors render the political economy of corporate law reforms 
particularly favorable to the interests of the government as controlling 
shareholder.  Not only does the state have a natural and unmatched 
proximity to the lawmaking process—and is hence uniquely positioned to 
influence its outcomes—but legal rules that favor the interests of the state 
  Nevertheless, a number of such actors and 
interests that influence state action—such as popular pressure in democratic 
societies, or the self-interest of government officials—tend to consistently 
favor the interests of the state as shareholder over those of outside investors. 
 
 10. See, e.g., STILPON NESTOR & LADAN MAHBOOBI, PRIVATISATION OF PUBLIC 
UTILITIES:  THE OECD EXPERIENCE 6 (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
48/24/1929700.pdf (noting that “[e]quity markets were narrow and illiquid in the great 
majority of OECD countries. . . .  [I]t seemed natural to choose government financing as an 
effective way of backing expansion in these resource-hungry, capital-intensive industries”). 
 11. See, e.g., Alexander Aganin & Paolo Volpin, The History of Corporate Ownership 
in Italy, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD:  FAMILY BUSINESS 
GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 325, 326 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005) (stating that, in 
Italy, “[d]irect intervention by the state as an entrepreneur partially replaced and crowded out 
the role of the private sector in the accumulation of capital”).  Still, the relationship between 
state ownership and capital market development is complex and resists oversimplification.  
Yet another source of complication relates to simultaneity problems due to omitted variable 
bias.  Following Mark Roe’s work, another plausible hypothesis is that the adoption of a 
social-democratic regime (due to, say, war destruction) determines the level of both state 
ownership and capital market development. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, 
and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006). 
 12. See, e.g., John Armour et al., A Comparative Analysis of Hostile Takeover Regimes 
in the US, UK and Japan (with Implications for Emerging Markets) (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for 
Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 377, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1657953 (providing an analytic 
framework describing how regulatory responses to hostile takeovers are shaped by the 
interaction between interest groups and different subordinate lawmakers within a given 
jurisdiction).  Part III.B infra discusses the implementation of different regulatory authorities 
as a potential solution to the state’s conflicts of interest. 
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as a shareholder over those of outside investors are often politically 
popular.  For example, even the most financially developed jurisdictions 
have far more taxpayers than shareholders in publicly traded firms.13
If ordinary citizens are often sympathetic to the state’s interests as a 
shareholder, controlling families are even more so.  In a system of 
concentrated corporate ownership, collective action problems allow 
controlling families to exercise disproportionate influence on legislative 
outcomes, stifling the enactment of investor protection laws.
  As a 
result, many citizens may come to favor legal rules that privilege the 
interests of the state as a controlling shareholder over those of minority (and 
often foreign) investors.  This risk is particularly acute since the same 
jurisdictions that exhibit higher levels of state-owned enterprise also tend to 
have less-developed capital markets and lower levels of stock ownership by 
households. 
14
This symbiotic relationship between state and family control of business 
corporations has been overlooked due to a persistent focus on the 
distinctiveness of government control vis-à-vis private ownership of 
enterprise.  In this sense, at least two differences stand out.  First, managers 
of SOEs typically face lower performance incentives than private firms, 
since public enterprises are generally subject to a “soft” budget constraint, 
shielded from bankruptcy and hostile takeovers, and limited in their ability 
to enhance managerial performance through high-powered compensation 
contracts.
  Moreover, 
the coexistence of state and family control significantly reinforces this 
pattern, as it creates a natural alignment of interests between the 
government and controlling families against minority shareholders.  As a 
result, even if the political clout of such families is discounted, the state, as 
the controlling shareholder of some of the largest publicly traded firms, 
may have independent reasons to oppose reforms that redistribute wealth to 
minority shareholders and to sponsor legal changes that facilitate minority 
expropriation. 
15
 
 13. This is due to a variety of factors, including income inequality, idiosyncratic 
preferences over risk and asset allocation, misinformation, and the participation of foreign 
investors in domestic markets.  Even in the United States, only about one-half of the 
country’s households own stocks. See INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, EQUITY 
OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2005, at 7 (2005), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_
05_equity_owners.pdf, for a description of the rise of equity ownership among U.S. 
households, which jumped from 19 percent in 1983 to 50.3 percent in 2005.  Of course, the 
large size of a given constituency is not synonymous with, and can indeed hinder, organized 
political influence. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:  PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53–57 (1971) (arguing that collective action in a group’s 
interest is facilitated when the group is small).  Nevertheless, if taxpayers face collective 
action problems, so do dispersed minority investors. 
  Second, but more importantly, state-controlled firms tend to 
 14. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 7, at 131. 
 15. See Albert Chong & Florencio López-de-Silanes, The Truth About Privatization in 
Latin America, in PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA:  MYTHS AND REALITY 1, 3 (Albert 
Chong & Florencio López-de-Silanes eds., 2005); OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF 
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES:  A SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES 14, 152–54 (2005). 
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pursue political or non-financial objectives other than shareholder wealth 
maximization.16
While differences between public and private ownership certainly exist 
(and are the subject of a large body of empirical literature
 
17), it is easy to 
overstate the extent to which the interests of the government as a 
controlling shareholder differ from those of private controlling 
shareholders.  Agency costs and the ensuing distortions in managerial 
incentives are a time-honored problem in widely held corporations, whereas 
the pursuit of non-pecuniary objectives beyond shareholder wealth 
maximization—widely acknowledged as the quintessential characteristic (or 
main evil) of government ownership—is hardly unique to SOEs.18
Indeed, too much emphasis on the differences between private and public 
control of enterprise has largely obscured their similarities.  Conceding that 
the model of the firm as a profit maximizer may be a worse fit to state-
owned firms does not mean that the government and managing bureaucrats 
are indifferent to the company’s size, revenue, and profit distribution.  A 
prominent strand of the literature on public choice models state and 
bureaucratic behavior based on the assumption that governments maximize 
fiscal revenues while bureaucracies maximize the size of their budgets.
 
19
 
 16. The reasons for the underperformance of state-owned enterprises are summarized by 
Chong & López-de-Silanes, supra note 
  In 
disregarding the interests of the state and managing bureaucrats in the 
distribution of SOE profits, the corporate governance literature has, 
ironically, embraced too benign a view of the state as shareholder.  The 
15, at 2–3. 
 17. The literature is too voluminous to be cited in full.  For a few examples, see 
generally Hamdi Ben-Nasr et al., The Political Determinants of the Cost of Equity:  Evidence 
from Newly Privatized Firms, 50 J. ACCT. RES. (forthcoming 2012) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578785 (finding that the cost of equity 
increases with the degree of government control of enterprise); Anthony E. Boardman & 
Aidan R. Vining, Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments:  A Comparison 
of the Performance of Private, Mixed and State-Owned Enterprises, 32 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1989) (finding that mixed and state-owned enterprises perform significantly worse than 
comparable private companies); Ginka Borisova et al., Government Ownership and 
Corporate Governance:  Evidence from the E.U., 36 J. BANKING & FIN. (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426612000234 
(concluding that government ownership is associated with lower governance quality); Mary 
M. Shirley & Patrick Walsh, Public Versus Private Ownership:  The Current State of the 
Debate (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2420, 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=261854. 
 18. See generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 733 (2005) (arguing that the claim that business corporations maximize profits is both 
descriptively and normatively wrong); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and 
Corporate Governance:  Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1641, 1663–64 (2006) (stressing that private controlling shareholders pursue non-pecuniary 
as well as pecuniary private benefits of control). 
 19. On prominent theories of state behavior that focus on the government’s fiscal 
interests, see generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY (1981), and MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY:  OUTGROWING COMMUNIST 
AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS (2000).  For a discussion of the merits and shortcomings of 
the widely employed assumption that bureaucrats are budget maximizers, see DENNIS C. 
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 362–65 (2003). 
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same scholars who warn against the risk of political management of state-
owned firms tend to assume that the government is otherwise unlikely to 
abuse minority investors.20  The cases analyzed here challenge these 
assumptions, as the actions of the state as a controlling shareholder have too 
often mirrored the archetypal expropriation techniques employed by private 
controlling shareholders.21
This study thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy 
of corporate governance.  Existing scholarship has failed to fully appreciate 
the influence of the state as shareholder in the development of corporate 
legal regimes, a force that has helped shape virtually every major corporate 
law issue—such as the degree of access to the corporate form, the legal 
regime of sale-of-control transactions, and the structure of shareholder 
voting rights—across different institutional settings.  It also explores the 
extent to which the relative retreat of state ownership during the wave of 
privatizations of the 1980s and 1990s may have contributed to the greater 
degree of convergence toward stronger shareholder rights worldwide during 
the same period by transforming the political economy of corporate law 
reforms. 
 
Part I of this Article analyzes how the interests of the government as 
shareholder have influenced corporate lawmaking in a variety of settings.  It 
begins by describing the U.S. experience in the nineteenth century and then 
turns to the cases of Brazil, China, and Continental Europe in the twentieth 
century.  Part II then speculates on the role that the wave of privatizations in 
the 1980s and 1990s, which reduced the importance of state ownership and 
therefore the state’s stake in corporate laws, might have played in 
transforming the political economy of corporate governance and in 
fostering capital market development.  Part III attempts to translate 
historical lessons into policy proposals by exploring the promise of 
different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s 
interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and by 
offering some recommendations that are both counterintuitive and contrary 
to influential Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) guidelines on SOEs.  The Article concludes by reflecting on the 
continued significance of state ownership and its implications for corporate 
governance. 
 
 20. Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1318 (dismissing concerns that “the government 
wants to enrich itself financially at the expense of the minority shareholders”). 
 21. Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon identify three principal methods for 
controlling shareholders to extract private benefits of control—namely, by taking for 
themselves a disproportionate amount of the firm’s operating earnings, by minority freeze-
outs, or by selling control at a premium. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon 
Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 786 (2003).  All of these 
methods can also be used by government-controlled firms. 
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I.  THE STATE AS SHAREHOLDER:  A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
A.  The United States 
Compared to most other jurisdictions around the world, traditional SOEs 
were significantly less common in the United States throughout the 
twentieth century.  Except for temporary takeovers of enemy property 
during wartime,22 the U.S. government largely refrained from nationalizing 
major industries and embracing a model of state capitalism in the post-
World War II period.  While mixed enterprises have dominated stock 
markets in many developed and developing countries, they were virtually 
non-existent in recent U.S. experience until the 2008 financial crisis.23  In 
fact, the very idea of having the federal government acquire equity stakes in 
distressed financial institutions reluctantly emerged as a policy transplant 
from England, a country with far greater historical experience and 
familiarity with state-owned enterprise.24  The partial nationalizations of 
distressed firms substituted the U.S. government’s initial plan for its 
Troubled Assets Relief Program25 (TARP), which consisted of less 
intrusive public purchases of “toxic” assets from the banks’ balance 
sheets.26
At least in the last century, the U.S. government has been largely immune 
from conflicts of interest in corporate governance regulation stemming from 
its interests as a corporate shareholder.  As described in greater detail 
below, while federal and state governments in the United States have 
frequently (and increasingly) employed the corporate form since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, they have traditionally done so either as 
a sole proprietor or as a guarantor, not as co-shareholder or residual owner 
in partnership with private capital. 
 
As the Supreme Court remarked in Lebron v. National Railroad 
Passenger Corp., the passenger railroad company Amtrak, as a 
government-owned corporation, was “not a unique, or indeed even a 
particularly unusual, phenomenon.”27
 
 22. See Stacey R. Kole & J. Harold Mulherin, The Government as a Shareholder:  A 
Case from the United States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3–5 (1997); see also Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that President Truman’s seizure of the 
steel companies involved in a labor dispute during the Korean War was unconstitutional as a 
violation of the separation of powers). 
  Indeed, U.S. federal and state 
governments have made lavish use of the corporate form to perform public 
 23. MUSOLF, supra note 1, at 2. 
 24. See Paul Krugman, Gordon Does Good, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, at A29 (stating 
that the initiative for government equity injections had to come from London rather than 
Washington due to the U.S. government’s ideology). 
 25. See Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 101–36, 122 Stat. 
3765, 3767–3800 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–5241 (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 26. Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal:  The Government’s 
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 526 (2009). 
 27. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 386 (1995).  Amtrak’s federal 
charter stated that it “shall be operated and managed as a for profit corporation.” Id. at 385 
(citing 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1988 and Supp. V)). 
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functions.  As of 1990, the official count included as many as 6,397 
government corporations in the United States, including 45 with federal 
charters—a number that seems to have been growing in recent years.28
Still, the vast majority of these corporations have assumed one of two 
forms:  (1) corporatized public instrumentalities, in which the corporate 
structure serves as an alternative organizational form to more traditional 
modes of public governance, or (2) privately owned but government-
sponsored enterprise.  As an example of the first type of organization, both 
state and federal governments have created corporations liberally in order to 
obtain greater operational flexibility over conventional public agencies or 
bureaucracies.  President Franklin Delano Roosevelt pitched the creation of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933, for example, as “a corporation 
clothed with the power of government but possessed of the flexibility and 
initiative of a private enterprise.”
 
29  The government is typically the sole 
owner of these corporations, which are often no more than state agencies 
organized under a different, and more flexible, legal structure.30
Additionally, the U.S. government has availed itself of a number of 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), of which the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac), are the foremost examples.
 
31
 
 28. JERRY MITCHELL, THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT WITH GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 
13, 15 (1999) (noting that the labels commonly used to refer to these corporations include 
“‘ad hoc government,’ ‘public authority,’ ‘public benefit corporation,’ ‘public corporation,’ 
‘public enterprise,’ and ‘special-purpose government’”).  A classic example of a federal 
government corporation performing commercial functions is the U.S. Postal Service; others 
performing regulatory functions include the Resolution Trust Corporation and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
  GSEs are 
chartered by the federal government to pursue public objectives or cure 
perceived market failures, but are organized in the form of profit-seeking 
corporations owned by private shareholders and listed on major exchanges.  
The government backing to GSEs does not come in the form of an equity 
stake but rather from its implicit guarantee to the corporation’s debt, which 
in turn helps advance the company’s public objectives by lowering its cost 
of capital.  This hybrid structure mitigates the intra-shareholder conflicts 
associated with state ownership, albeit at the cost of creating even greater 
 29. From the New Deal to a New Century, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., http://www.tva.gov/
abouttva/history.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  In response to the proliferation of 
government corporations following the Great Depression, Congress enacted the Government 
Corporation Control Act of 1945, which was designed to restrain the formation of 
government corporations and enhance their accountability.  For a detailed discussion of the 
Act, see C. Herman Pritchett, The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 40 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 495, 509 (1946). 
 30. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400 (holding that First Amendment protections apply to 
Amtrak); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 543, 548. 
 31. All of the six GSEs are financial institutions, a select group that also includes the 
Federal Home Loan Bank System (housing), the Farm Credit System and Farmer Mac 
(agriculture), and Sallie Mae (student loans). See THOMAS H. STANTON, GOVERNMENT-
SPONSORED ENTERPRISES:  MERCANTILIST COMPANIES IN THE MODERN WORLD, at xi (2002). 
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misalignment of interests between corporate shareholders and management, 
who benefit from the stock price appreciation due to risk-taking activities, 
and taxpayers, who are left to pick up the bill in case of failure.32
Neither wholly owned government corporations nor GSEs pose the 
agency problems that are typical of multi-owner firms, since in the former 
case the government is the sole owner, and in the latter case it is not an 
owner at all.  Until the 2008 financial crisis, simultaneous private and 
public ownership of business corporations in the United States was rare and 
of little practical significance.
 
33  Whereas a number of companies were 
formally chartered as “mixed enterprises,” most of them have converted to 
either entirely public or private ownership.34
The Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), which was the 
object of the “most widely-publicized and hotly-contested battle involving 
mixed enterprise in the twentieth century,” turned out not to embrace a 
mixed-ownership model.
 
35  Comsat’s 1962 federal charter allowed the U.S. 
President to appoint three “public interest” directors out of its fifteen board 
members, but the firm was to be entirely owned by private sector 
shareholders.36
Nevertheless, mixed-ownership corporations have a long historical 
pedigree in the United States.  The establishment of the Bank of North 
America of 1781—a mixed-ownership corporation and the country’s first 
bank—preceded the adoption of the U.S. Constitution and was instrumental 
to the country’s continued independence.
  Comsat’s governance structure ensured governmental 
influence and supervision without implicating the state’s financial interest 
in the enterprise. 
37  Similarly, the First Bank of the 
United States of 1791 was also a mixed-ownership company in which the 
U.S. government held up to 20 percent of its stock.38
The tension between the state’s interests as a shareholder and its role as a 
corporate regulator was clear from the outset.  In the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, the most salient corporate issues were not 
 
 
 32. The 2008 financial crisis made the serious character of these risks all too familiar.  
For an early description and analysis of the characteristics and conflicts inherent to GSEs, 
see generally JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT:  HYBRID 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL (2003). 
 33. See MUSOLF, supra note 1, at 2. 
 34. Froomkin, supra note 30, at 573 (concluding that the conceptual and practical 
difficulties associated with mixed enterprises are “largely theoretical at present”). 
 35. LLOYD D. MUSOLF, MIXED ENTERPRISE:  A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 56 (1972). 
“Paradoxically, none of the ‘mixed-ownership’ government corporations listed in the 
Government Corporations Control Act are that.” Id. at 51. 
 36. Comsat was created by the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. See Lebron v. 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 391–92 (1995); Herman Schwartz, 
Governmentally Appointed Directors in a Private Corporation—The Communications 
Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HARV. L. REV. 350, 353 (1965). 
 37. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, TREASURY DEP’T, REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK 92 (1790) 
(claiming that “American independence owes much to [the Bank of North America]”); see 
Froomkin, supra note 30, at 547 n.9 (noting that the Bank of North America was chartered 
by the Continental Congress and was 60 percent owned by the Superintendent of Finance). 
 38. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 386. 
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managerial agency costs and the resulting need for shareholder protection, 
as is the case today, but rather access to corporate charters, which at the 
time still required an individualized act of the legislature.39
Take, for instance, the case of early banking in Philadelphia as described 
by Anna Schwartz.
  And, as it turns 
out, the financial interests of states as shareholders of incumbent firms 
influenced their willingness to charter potential competitors. 
40  Facing a budget surplus in 1792, the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania saw the highly lucrative Bank of North America, which 
was by then wholly owned by private merchants, as a promising investment 
opportunity.41  The state proposed to acquire a significant amount of the 
bank’s stock, but negotiations with existing shareholders ultimately broke 
down.42  Local merchants who were dissatisfied with their accommodation 
in the Bank of North America saw this as an opportunity to obtain a 
corporate charter for a competing institution, the Bank of Pennsylvania.43  
In consideration for the grant of a charter to the Bank of Pennsylvania, the 
state was allowed to subscribe to one-third of the bank’s capital stock, to be 
paid through a combination of specie, federal debt, and proceeds of a loan 
from the bank.44
In 1803, still another group of credit-hungry merchants petitioned the 
legislature to incorporate the Philadelphia Bank.
 
45  The petition met with 
resistance from the Bank of Pennsylvania, which—itself a direct product of 
the state’s profit-making objectives—now appealed to the government’s 
interests as a shareholder to oppose the incorporation of a new bank.46  It 
argued that the chartering of another banking institution would reduce the 
Bank of Pennsylvania’s profits and therefore jeopardize the state’s 
investment.47  Citizens argued before the legislature that, in light of “‘the 
extensive interest which the state holds in the Bank of Pennsylvania, they 
cannot too seriously consider the probable baneful effects of an additional 
chartered Bank at this period, on the fiscal concerns of the state and on the 
banking system.’”48
 
 39. See Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting 
Rights:  Separation of Ownership from Consumption 6 & n.10 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that “even if investor protection considerations 
have arguably become paramount in the end of history of corporate law, they were certainly 
not as important in the beginning of history”). 
 
 40. See generally Anna Jacobson Schwartz, The Beginning of Competitive Banking in 
Philadelphia, 1782-1809, 55 J. POL. ECON. 417 (1947). 
 41. See id. at 423–24.  
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. at 418–19.  The primary motivation of bank shareholders in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries was to obtain access to the bank’s services (discounts and 
short-term loans) rather than a financial return on the stock.  For a description of this 
argument, see Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 39, at 11–12. 
 44. See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 423–24. 
 45. See id. at 426–27. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 429 (quoting S. JOURNAL, 249, 257, 269–70 (Pa. 1803–1804)). 
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The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania thus faced a familiar dilemma.  In 
the words of Schwartz, “[A]s a stockholder in the Bank of Pennsylvania, its 
interests presumably coincided with those of the private investors in the 
bank, but as arbiter of the public welfare, it had to consider the views of the 
promoters of the Philadelphia Bank.  These conflicted with the ambitions of 
Bank of Pennsylvania stockholders.”49  The legislative committee in charge 
of evaluating the charter petition was initially determined to privilege the 
interests of the state as a shareholder.50  It issued an unfavorable report on 
the charter application, deeming it against the “public interest” as possibly 
damaging to the state’s financial stake in the Bank of Pennsylvania.51
The state’s conflict of interest did not go unnoticed.  One legislative 
proposal argued that elimination of the conflict required the state to divest 
its stock holdings in banks.  It contended that 
 
[i]t being the duty of the government to consult the general will and 
provide for the good of all, embarrassments must frequently be thrown in 
the way of the performance of this duty, when the government is coupled 
in interest with institutions whose rights are founded in monopoly, and 
whose prosperity depends on the exclusion and suppression of similar 
institutions.52
This proposal for divestiture was defeated, but the Philadelphia Bank was 
able to engage successfully in Coasean bargaining and obtain a charter.  In 
exchange for incorporation, the Bank of Philadelphia offered the state a 
$135,000 cash payment, permitted the state to make a significant stock 
subscription, and loaned $100,000 to the Commonwealth.
 
53  After winning 
a bidding war with the Bank of Pennsylvania—which offered the state 
significant boons for denying its competitor’s application for a charter—the 
Bank of Philadelphia was finally incorporated in 1804.54
The state’s new holdings in the Philadelphia Bank had the potential to 
create the same conflicts of interest in future charter requests.  Sure enough, 
Pennsylvania’s interests as a shareholder led it once again to oppose an 
incorporation petition from the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank in 1807.
 
55  
Side payments to the state government were repeatedly employed to satisfy 
the “public interest,” until the liquidation of the state’s shareholdings in 
banks in 1837 created the preconditions for a truly liberal chartering 
policy.56
Pennsylvania was not unique in experiencing a tension between the 
state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator.  John Wallis, Richard Sylla, 
and John Legler have provided systematic evidence that individual states’ 
 
 
 49. Id. at 426–27. 
 50. Id. at 426. 
 51. See Richard Sylla, Early American Banking:  The Significance of the Corporate 
Form, 14 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 105, 111 (1985). 
 52. Schwartz, supra note 40, at 427 (quoting H. JOURNAL, 193 (Pa. 1812–13)). 
 53. Id. at 429. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 430–31. 
 56. Sylla, supra note 51, at 111. 
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financial interests had a substantial impact on their policies toward bank 
chartering.  States whose main source of banking-related revenue came 
from taxes were significantly more likely to adopt a liberal chartering 
process than those in which the state was invested as a major bank 
shareholder.57
Nor was the shareholder–regulator conflict limited to the incorporation of 
financial institutions.  In the nineteenth century, U.S. state governments 
were also heavily invested in transportation improvement companies 
(notably turnpikes, canals, and railroads) and kept these interests in mind 
when reviewing charter applications from potential competitors.  The State 
of New York’s interest in the economic success of the Erie Canal—which, 
in a historic example of public entrepreneurship, it built and financed on its 
own—illustrates the problem.  Despite its pioneering role in the enactment 
of general incorporation statutes, New York refrained from passing a 
general incorporation law for canals to prevent competition from impairing 
the ratings of the Erie Canal’s state bonds.
 
58  Citizens were sympathetic to 
the state’s fiscal interests, leading to a “loud popular cry” against potential 
competition from railroads.59  As a result, the New York legislature passed 
laws preventing railroads from carrying freight, hence guaranteeing the Erie 
Canal’s monopoly.60
In New Jersey, this pattern was even more prevalent.  The state’s 
infamous “monopoly bill” of 1832, which granted exclusive privileges to 
the Camden and Amboy railroad, was a bargained-for statute passed in 
exchange for a significant gift of company stock to the state.
 
61  The state’s 
equity stake in the railroad turned out to be so profitable that it significantly 
reduced the taxes levied on its citizenry,62
 
 57. See John Joseph Wallis, Richard E. Sylla & John B. Legler, The Interaction of 
Taxation and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century U.S. Banking, in THE REGULATED 
ECONOMY:  A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 121, 142 (Claudia Goldin & 
Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994). 
 thus making the monopoly 
politically popular.  When a turnpike company applied for a competing 
charter a few years later, the committee in charge of the matter opined 
negatively on the petition so as to “preserve inviolate, sacred and 
unimpaired, the faith, the integrity, and the revenues of the state, by a strict 
adherence to the system of policy which has laid the foundation of our 
 58. RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-
1855:  BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SERVICE DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION 43 
(1982). 
 59. ARTHUR T. HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION:  ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAWS 11 
(1886). 
 60. JANEY LEVY, THE ERIE CANAL:  A PRIMARY SOURCE HISTORY OF THE CANAL THAT 
CHANGED AMERICA 38 (2003). 
 61. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 133 (3d ed. 2005). 
 62. Id. 
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Internal Improvements, the principles of protection as a means of 
revenue.”63
Lawmakers also took into account the state’s interests as a shareholder in 
defining appropriate rules for corporate governance.  In 1846, the Revisors 
of the Civil Code of Virginia focused on the implications for “the finances 
of the state” to justify a proposed revision to relax the strict regressive 
voting scale prevalent at the time, which severely limited the voting rights 
of large shareholders.
 
64  They noted that “[t]he state has subscribed largely 
to works of internal improvement, and to her it is desirable that each work 
to which she subscribes should be so managed as not to sink the capital, but 
make it a source of some income.”65  The Revisors deemed that the state’s 
financial interests would be best served by affording greater voting rights to 
large shareholders, who had an incentive to make decisions in order to 
maximize the values of their investment, rather than by giving 
comparatively greater voice to small holders, who could exercise their 
voting rights so as to privilege their interests as users by favoring low tolls 
to the detriment of profitability.66
As capital and product markets developed throughout the nineteenth 
century, mixed enterprises became increasingly rare and remained so well 
into the twentieth century.
 
67  Yet, throughout the twentieth century, and 
especially in the post-war period, the state continued to share in the profits 
of business corporations.  It did so no longer through equity ownership, but 
rather via taxation.  In the years after World War II, while non-U.S. 
governments were rapidly increasing their equity holdings in important 
segments of the economy, the U.S. income tax rate applicable to business 
corporations was such as to, in the words of Adolph Berle, “virtually 
make[] the state an equal partner [in the corporate enterprise] as far as 
profits are concerned.”68  Meanwhile, the provisions of U.S. corporate law 
continued to be influenced by the states’ financial interests—no longer as 
corporate shareholders but rather as collectors of corporate franchise 
taxes.69
 
 63. John Joseph Wallis, Market-Augmenting Government?  States and Corporations in 
Nineteenth-Century America, in MARKET-AUGMENTING GOVERNMENT:  THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS FOR PROSPERITY 223, 251 (Omar Azfar & Charles A. Cadwell eds., 2003). 
 
 64. REPORT OF THE REVISORS OF THE CIVIL CODE OF VIRGINIA MADE TO THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY AT DECEMBER SESSION 1846, at 335 (1847). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  For a detailed analysis of how regressive voting schemes in the nineteenth-
century served to protect the interests of consumers rather than investors, see Hansmann & 
Pargendler, supra note 39. 
 67. Stephen Brooks, The Mixed Ownership Corporation as an Instrument of Public 
Policy, 19 COMP. POL. 173, 176 (1987). 
 68. Adolph A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution:  A Preface to the Revised 
Edition (Dec. 1967), reprinted in ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, at xxviii (2d ed. 1991) (“Under the recent tax 
reduction, the federal government presently taxes corporate profits above $25,000 at the rate 
of about 50 per cent.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of 
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255 (1977) (noting that both Delaware and its 
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Nevertheless, the government’s financial interest in tax revenues creates 
different—and arguably more benign—regulatory incentives compared to 
outright ownership.  The federal government’s financial interest in income 
taxes favors the enactment of efficient corporate and securities regulations 
that maximize firm revenue.  Although the states’ interests in franchise 
taxes may lead them to enact corporate laws that are more managerialist 
than is socially desirable, their incentives to favor controlling over minority 
shareholders are still much weaker than when the state itself is the 
controlling shareholder. 
B.  Brazil 
In contrast to the United States, but as in most other jurisdictions around 
the world, mixed corporations in Brazil became more common in the 
twentieth century, especially in the second half.  While most nineteenth-
century railroad corporations enjoyed publicly guaranteed dividends but 
were owned by private shareholders, by 1929 the government had taken 
over two-thirds of the country’s railways, a fraction that would further 
increase in the following years.70  However, it was not until the early 1940s, 
with the incorporation of the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN) in 
1941 (steel) and the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce in 1942 (mining), that 
Brazil witnessed the emergence of the first large-scale mixed enterprises 
having the government as a controlling shareholder from the outset.71
The impetus for the creation of these national giants came from a 
combination of national security considerations in view of the ongoing 
world war and a lack of private capital for financing industrialization.
 
72  
Brazil’s National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico (BNDE), later Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico 
e Social (BNDES)), established in 1952, became an important financing 
source of government corporations before switching roles to operate as a 
main financier of the private sector in subsequent decades.73  In 1953, the 
federal government incorporated the oil company Petrobras as a mixed 
enterprise following a strong nationalistic campaign based on the slogan “O 
Petróleo é Nosso (The Oil is Ours).”74
 
competitors “candidly admit that the purpose of corporate code revisions has been the 
attraction of charters to their state in order to produce significant tax revenues”). 
  While the CSN and the BNDE 
initially benefited from U.S. government loans in connection with war 
cooperation efforts, most state-owned firms were primarily financed via 
 70. PETER EVANS, DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT:  THE ALLIANCE OF MULTINATIONAL, 
STATE, AND LOCAL CAPITAL IN BRAZIL 84 (1979). 
 71. See id. at 88–89. 
 72. See generally ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1962). 
 73. Werner Baer & Annibal V. Villela, The Changing Nature of Development Banking 
in Brazil, 22 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 423, 425–34 (1980).  
 74. EVANS, supra note 70, at 91. 
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taxation.75  Initially by practice, and later by law,76
Starting in 1964, the ruling military government inaugurated an 
ambitious program to develop Brazil’s capital markets, relying heavily on 
fiscal incentives in the form of favorable tax treatment for both investors 
and publicly traded companies.
 mixed enterprises in 
Brazil (sociedades de economia mista) had necessarily to be organized as a 
business corporation (sociedade anônima). 
77  The program was part of a series of 
then-recent anti-inflationary policies which, by restricting governmental 
loans to the private sector, triggered a severe working capital shortage in 
many firms.78  This policy was strengthened with the enactment of Decree-
Law 157 in 1967, which allowed taxpayers to allocate up to 10 percent of 
their federal income tax dues to make personal investments in publicly 
traded firms through certain mutual funds (157 funds)—thus making the 
purchase of shares in listed companies essentially free from a shareholder’s 
perspective, since the price was paid by the government.79  Moreover, the 
government further reinforced the creation of compulsory demand for 
domestic equities by imposing a legal requirement that pension funds and 
insurance companies invest a minimum percentage of their portfolio in 
local stock markets.80
The upshot of these measures was a massive flow of funds into public 
companies, and a capital market boom.
 
81  The governmental policies 
induced a number of family owned firms to undertake their first public 
issue of stock.  And, perhaps more important, these policies led to a great 
expansion of state-owned firms with publicly traded shares, both because a 
large number of existing or newly created SOEs sold shares to the public 
for the first time, and because SOEs that were already listed sold additional 
shares.  Indeed, state-controlled corporations turned out to be the foremost 
beneficiaries of the captive demand created by the government’s program to 
foster capital market development through forced savings.82
 
 75. LUCIANO MARTINS, ESTADO CAPITALISTA E BUROCRACIA NO BRASIL PÓS-64, at 60 
(1985). 
 
 76. Decreto-Lei No. 200, art. 5, de 25 de Fevereiro de 1967, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 27.02.1967 (Braz.) (text given by Decreto Lei No. 900, de 29 de Setembro de 
1969, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 30.09.1969 (Braz.)). 
 77. For a detailed description of these policies, see generally David M. Trubek, Law, 
Planning and the Development of the Brazilian Capital Market:  A Study of Law in 
Economic Change, BULLETIN (New York Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Inst. of Fin.) 
nos. 72–73 (1971). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Decreto-Lei No. 157, art. 3, de 10 de Fevereiro de 1967, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.02.1967 (Braz.) (revoked by Decreto Lei No. 2.065, de 26 de Outubro 
de 1983, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 28.10.1983 (Braz.)). 
 80. See, e.g., Flávio M. Rabelo & Flávio C. Vasconcelos, Corporate Governance in 
Brazil, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 321, 329 (2002). 
 81. By the end of 1967, the trading volume on the Brazilian stock exchanges had risen 
by 91 percent. DAVID M. TRUBEK ET AL., O MERCADO DE CAPITAIS E OS INCENTIVOS FISCAIS 
150 (1971). 
 82. José Roberto Mendonça de Barros & Douglas H. Graham, The Brazilian Economic 
Miracle Revisited:  Private and Public Sector Initiative in a Market Economy, 13 LATIN AM. 
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As contemporary economists put it, “[W]hat began as an institutional 
reform to promote the low cost capitalization of private sector growth has in 
effect become a vehicle for public enterprise capital expansion.”83  
Government-controlled firms figured among the “blue chips” traded on 
Brazil’s stock exchanges, and were responsible for 75 percent of the 
market’s trading volume.84  The magnitude of the expansion of state-owned 
enterprise is striking, with 231 public firms created between 1966 and 
1976.85  By 1974, twenty-two of the top twenty-five companies in the 
Brazilian economy were controlled by the government, with SOEs 
accounting for 49.7 percent of the total net book value of the top 1,000 
Brazilian firms.86
In the 1970s, academics and policymakers came to recognize the 
insufficiency of tax incentives and the importance of stronger legal 
protections for minority shareholders for increasing investor confidence and 
interest in corporate securities.  Brazilian economist Mário Henrique 
Simonsen, then Treasury Secretary, resented Brazil’s dearth of large private 
enterprise, which he attributed to the absence of legal mechanisms to 
protect minority shareholders from expropriation, thus encouraging capital 
aggregation.
 
87  Nevertheless, having just used generous tax incentives to 
induce a large number of companies to go public—all of which had either 
wealthy families or the state itself as controlling shareholder—Brazil’s legal 
reform process faced an uphill political battle.88
Given the prominence of SOEs in Brazil’s corporate landscape, some 
scholars advocated the adoption of a separate statute to suit the peculiar 
needs and characteristics of government-controlled firms, a proposal that 
was defeated.
  Both controlling families 
and the state had a vested interest in preventing the adoption of sweeping 
legal reforms that could redistribute corporate wealth and power away from 
controlling shareholders toward minority shareholders. 
89
 
RES. REV. 5, 21 (1978) (“State enterprises rather than private firms were the major 
beneficiaries [of tax incentives].”). 
  In the absence of special legislation, the prevailing 
approach was instead to enact a single new Corporations Law in 1976, but 
to insert a new (and remarkably lean) chapter devoted to sociedades de 
 83. Id. at 10. 
 84. MARTINS, supra note 75, at 71. 
 85. THOMAS J. TREBAT, BRAZIL’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES:  A CASE STUDY OF THE 
STATE AS ENTREPRENEUR 36 (1983) (noting that there was “not only the growth of public 
enterprises in the postwar period but also the proliferation of such entities under conservative 
military governments in the 1960s and 1970s”). 
 86. QUEM É QUEM NA ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA 45 (Visão ed., 1974); Mendonça de Barros 
& Graham, supra note 82, at 8. 
 87. MÁRIO HENRIQUE SIMONSEN, BRASIL 2002, at 124 (1973). 
 88. For a more thorough description, see Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana 
Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy:  Corporate Reform in Brazil, 
the United States and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475 (2011). 
 89. See, e.g., José Cretella Júnior, Sociedades de Economia Mista no Brasil, 80 REVISTA 
DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 33, 37 (1965) (defending the adoption of a separate statute to 
govern state-owned firms). 
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economia mista.90  The chapter made clear that, except as otherwise 
specified therein or in federal law, publicly traded mixed enterprises were 
subject to the same corporate law rules and regulations of the newly created 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários 
(CVM)) as private issuers.91
Interestingly, this chapter expressly imposed on directors and controlling 
shareholders of mixed enterprises the same fiduciary duties applicable to 
privately owned corporations (thus incorporating the relevant provisions by 
reference), even though it specifically permitted the government to “steer 
the company’s activity toward the public interest that justified its 
creation.”
 
92  However, what could look like an intractable tension between 
standard fiduciary duties and government control was more apparent than 
real.  The general fiduciary duties created by the 1976 Corporations Law 
were exceedingly broad—indeed, probably too broad to effectively 
constrain abusive behavior.  The pertinent provisions of the statute provide 
that controlling shareholders shall attend to the interests not only of 
shareholders, but also of employees, the community, and even the national 
economy.93
In the years following passage of the 1976 statute, state-owned 
enterprises, which were until then perceived as highly successful and 
beneficial to the economy, entered a period of crisis.
  All in all, Brazil’s Corporations Law proved to be quite 
accommodating to the needs of the government as a controlling 
shareholder. 
94
 
 90. Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
17.12.1976 (Braz.). 
  In the general 
environment of international debt crisis and mounting inflationary pressures 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Brazilian government increasingly 
 91. Id. art. 235. 
 92. Id. art. 238 (“[O]rientar as atividades da companhia de modo a atender ao interesse 
público que justificou a sua criação.”). 
 93. Id. art. 116 ( “The controlling shareholder must use its influence so as to make the 
company fulfill its purpose and its social function, and has duties and responsibilities to the 
other shareholders, employees and the community in which it operates, whose rights and 
interests he must loyally abide by and respect.”) (“O acionista controlador deve usar o 
poder com o fim de fazer a companhia realizar o seu objeto e cumprir sua função social, e 
tem deveres e responsabilidades para com os demais acionistas da empresa, os que nela 
trabalham e para com a comunidade em que atua, cujos direitos e interesses deve lealmente 
respeitar e attender.”); art. 117, § 1(a) (listing as an instance of controlling shareholder 
abuse the act of “steering the company towards a purpose foreign to its corporate object or 
damaging of national interest, or leading it to favor another Brazilian or foreign company, to 
the detriment of the minority’s shareholder’s participation in the profits or assets of the 
company, or to the national economy”) (“orientar a companhia para fim estranho ao objeto 
social ou lesivo ao interesse nacional, ou levá-la a favorecer outra sociedade, brasileira ou 
estrangeira, em prejuízo da participação dos acionistas minoritários nos lucros ou no 
acervo da companhia, ou da economia nacional”). 
 94. Werner Baer, The Privatization Experience of Brazil, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 
ON PRIVATIZATION 220, 221 (David Parker & David Saal eds., 2003) (stressing the 
widespread “benign perception” enjoyed from the 1950s through the 1970s by Brazilian 
SOEs, which were the beneficiaries of a significant part of World Bank and USAID loans to 
Brazil). 
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came to employ state-owned firms as an instrument of macroeconomic 
policy.  SOEs were ultimately forced to underprice their output in order to 
control rising inflation as well as to curb their investments and financing in 
foreign currency.95
While the influence of state interests in the development of the 1976 
Corporations Law was subtle, subsequent legal reforms that were 
implemented in connection with Brazil’s privatization process would 
provide a textbook example of the influence of the state as shareholder in 
corporate lawmaking.  Although many features of the privatization process 
are unique to the state as a selling shareholder, the device used by the 
government to extract private benefits of control—insiders’ appropriation 
of a large control premium not available to minority investors—is familiar 
in private sector transactions.
  These policies resulted in a deterioration of the 
financial condition of state-owned firms that, combined with an 
international context favoring a smaller government, gave rise to pressures 
for the privatization of Brazilian companies.  It was not until the 1990s, 
however, that a large-scale privatization movement finally took off. 
96
Brazil’s National Denationalization Program (Programa Nacional de 
Desestatização (PND)), enacted into law in 1990, specified the procedures 
to be followed in privatization.
 
97  The objectives of the PND were 
numerous—and conflicting.  The program’s stated goals simultaneously 
included “reduction of public debt and the balancing of public finances” 
and “the strengthening of capital markets, through an increase in public 
offerings and the democratization of the capital of the companies taking 
part in the Program.”98
Due to a combination of unfavorable macroeconomic conditions and 
insufficient investor protection, price-earnings ratios for Brazilian stocks 
were extremely low in the 1990s, with three-fourths of companies having a 
PE ratio below nine (against an average of twenty-one for the S&P 500 
during the same period), and with more than half of these firms displaying 
share prices of less than 50 percent of book value.
  However, in the Brazilian context of low investor 
protection and, consequently, low stock valuations, public offerings were 
unlikely to lead to revenue maximization absent major legal reforms. 
99
 
 95. ROGÉRIO L.F. WERNECK, EMPRESAS ESTATAIS E POLÍTICA MACROECONÔMICA 13–14 
(1987). 
  Brazilian 
policymakers at the time reasoned that public share offerings would not 
only fail to maximize government revenue, but were also unlikely to 
 96. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 21, at 787. 
 97. Lei No. 8.031, de 12 de Abril de 1990, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
13.04.1990 (Braz.). 
 98. Id. art. 1, I (“reordenar a posição estratégica do Estado na economia, transferindo à 
iniciativa privada atividades indevidamente exploradas pelo setor público”); II (“contribuir 
para a redução da dívida pública, concorrendo para o saneamento das finanças do setor 
público”); VI (“contribuir para o fortalecimento do mercado de capitais, através do 
acréscimo da oferta de valores mobiliários e da democratização da propriedade do capital 
das empresas que integrarem o Programa”). 
 99. SOLUÇÕES PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO MERCADO DE CAPITAIS BRASILEIRO 55–56 
(Carlos Antonio Rocca ed., 2001). 
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generate sufficient levels of ownership dispersion and capital market 
development to justify the effort.100
Empirical studies would later find that jurisdictions displaying low levels 
of legal protection of investors, and high levels of private benefits of 
control, were more likely to sell SOEs through private block sales rather 
than through share issue privatizations (SIPs), thus signaling privatizing 
governments’ revenue-maximizing behavior.
 
101  As a country that had, at 
an estimated 65 percent of firm value, the highest private benefits of control 
among thirty-nine sampled countries between 1990 and 2000 according to a 
study by Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, this is precisely what Brazil 
did.102  According to William Megginson and colleagues’ study on methods 
states have chosen to divest government equity stakes, Brazil was one of the 
countries with the lowest ratio of SIPs to privatizations worldwide.103
Nevertheless, while existing studies on the choice of sales method in 
privatizations take the level of investor protection as given, the evidence 
from Brazil shows otherwise.  Taking full advantage of its unique ability to 
reshape corporate law rules to further increase the already ample 
opportunities for extraction of private benefits of control, the Brazilian 
government in 1997 promoted a so-called “mini-reform” of the 
Corporations Law of 1976 with the acquiescence of controlling families.  
Although criticized by legal scholars and corporate governance experts, the 
reform was seen as “technocratic” and turned out not to be politically 
controversial.
 
104
 
 100. Luciano Coutinho & Flavio Marcilio Rabelo, Brazil:  Keeping It in the Family, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPMENT:  THE EXPERIENCES OF BRAZIL, CHILE, INDIA, 
AND SOUTH AFRICA 35, 47 (Charles P. Oman ed., 2003). 
  The subject matter of the new law was not salient enough 
to attract the attention of broad segments of the Brazilian population, which, 
in any case, would likely be sympathetic to the government’s attempt to 
maximize its privatization proceeds to cover the country’s sizable external 
deficit. 
 101. See William L. Megginson et al., The Choice of Private Versus Public Capital 
Markets:  Evidence from Privatizations, 59 J. FIN. 2835 (2004) (finding a direct relationship 
between the share of SIPs over total privatizations and the level of legal investor protections 
in a given jurisdiction); see also Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of 
Control:  An International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 538–39 (2004) (finding that 
privatizations through block sales are more common among countries displaying high 
private benefits of control). 
 102. Dyck & Zingales, supra note 101, at 538.  According to a different study, which 
used dual-class price differentials to estimate private benefits of control, an average 
Brazilian controlling shareholder could expect to extract up to 33.3 percent of the value of 
the company by holding as little as one-sixth of total cash flow rights. Tatiana Nenova, The 
Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control:  A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 
325, 327 (2003). 
 103. Megginson et al., supra note 101, at 2865. 
 104. Leslie Elliot Armijo & Walter Ness Jr., Contested Meanings of “Corporate 
Governance Reform”:  The Case of Democratic Brazil, 1985-2003, at 16–17  (prepared for 
the Annual Meeting of the Latin Am. Studies Ass’n, Oct. 7–9, 2004), available at 
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2004/files/NessWalter_
xCD.pdf. 
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Prior to the reform, Brazil’s Corporations Law granted statutory appraisal 
rights (direito de retirada) to dissenting minority shareholders from spin-off 
transactions.105  It also imposed a mandatory bid requirement (dubbed “tag-
along” rights in Brazil) for common shares held by minority shareholders at 
the same share price paid to the controlling block upon a sale of control.  
The new statute, Law 9,457 of 1997, did away with both of these 
protections.106  The removal of appraisal rights allowed the government to 
carry out cheaply its planned strategy of spinning off portfolio companies 
prior to their sale, thus avoiding out-of-pocket payments to dissenting 
shareholders and judicial disputes over the amounts due.  The elimination 
of the mandatory bid requirement, in turn, permitted the state to appropriate 
the totality of the control premium to itself.107
To be sure, the efficiency of premium-sharing, or “equal opportunity” 
rules (of which the mandatory bid rule is but one example), is the object of 
considerable controversy.  There is a large body of literature suggesting that 
mechanisms that force controlling shareholders to share a control premium 
with minority investors are inefficient, as they do not differentiate between 
value-adding and value-decreasing acquisitions, and thus equally 
discourage both types of transactions.
 
108  However, in the Brazilian context 
of weak investor protection in going-private transactions, the elimination of 
the mandatory bid rule deprived minority shareholders of the opportunity to 
exit at a fair price upon a sale of control, and therefore exposed them to 
subsequent expropriation in abusive delisting transactions and freeze-out 
mergers.109
Following the enactment of the statute, the Brazilian state went on to sell 
the cream of its holdings in return for a significant premium.  There was a 
significant jump in privatization proceeds following the enactment of the 
 
 
 105. Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, art. 137, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 17.12.1976 (Braz.). 
 106. Lei No. 9.457, de 05 de Maio de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
06.05.1997 (Braz.). 
 107. See Armijo & Ness, supra note 104, at 16. 
 108. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate 
Control, 1994 Q.J. ECON. 957 (arguing that premium-sharing requirements may lead to an 
increase in concentrated corporate control in the hands of a controlling shareholder); Frank 
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 
716, 737 (1982) (arguing that unequal sharing of gains in corporate control transactions 
maximizes shareholder wealth); Marcel Kahan, Sales of Corporate Control, 9 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 368, 378 (1993) (suggesting that premium-sharing requirements may be less efficient 
than private control transfers for sales of high fractions of corporate shares); see also John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency:  Can Delaware Law 
Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359, 
364–66 (1996) (stating that U.S. federal and state laws contain multiple legal mechanisms 
that discourage controlling shareholders from receiving a control premium, at least when the 
intent is to freeze out the minority). 
 109. Maria Helena Santana, The Novo Mercado, in FOCUS:  NOVO MERCADO AND ITS 
FOLLOWERS:  CASE STUDIES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM 1, 12–15 (2008). 
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amendments to the Corporations Law in May 1997, from US$6.5 billion in 
1996 to $26.7 billion in 1997 and $37.5 billion in 1998.110
The crown jewel of the privatization process was Telebras, a telecom 
company whose divestiture in one of the largest privatization transactions in 
history was a major driver behind the 1997 legal reform.  Prior to its 
privatization in 1998, Telebras alone accounted for approximately 60 
percent of all trades in the São Paulo Stock Exchange.  The expected 
government gains from the legal reform abolishing premium-sharing 
requirements were substantial. 
 
Through the ample use of preferred non-voting shares and, to a lesser 
extent, a pyramidal structure, the government was in a position to transfer 
uncontested control of Telebras by selling less than one-fifth of their total 
equity capital.111  When the company was privatized, the federal 
government held 51.79 percent of Telebras common shares, amounting to 
19.26 percent of the company’s total capital, while foreign shareholders 
held roughly 40 percent of the company’s total equity.112  Telebras’s 
ownership structure, which allowed the state to exercise uncontested control 
while holding only a minority of the company’s cash-flow rights, distorted 
the government’s incentives as the controlling shareholder by encouraging 
it to appropriate a disproportionate amount of the firm’s value.113  As 
planned, the Brazilian government succeeded in obtaining a substantial 
control premium from the sale of Telebras.  Economists estimate that the 
price of US$19 billion received by the government represented a premium 
of roughly 160 percent over the price of Telebras non-voting preferred 
stock.114
The 1997 revisions to Brazil’s Corporations Law provide a paradigmatic 
example of the risks that state ownership under a unitary corporate law 
regime poses to the overall corporate governance environment.  Since the 
new statutory amendments were general in nature and by no means 
restricted to SOEs, they also benefited private firms’ controlling 
shareholders to the detriment of outside investors.  Consequently, control 
sales of government and privately owned firms alike were made at 
 
 
 110. BRAZILIAN DEV. BANK, PRIVATIZATION IN BRAZIL:  1990-1994, 1995-2002, at 3 
(2002), available at http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes_en/
Galerias/Download/studies/priv_brazil.pdf. 
 111. Telebras’s pyramidal structure was a result of its historical self-financing model, in 
which the sale of telephone lines was financed by the consumers themselves in exchange for 
shares of stock in the local company.  The telephone company would then install the line 
within twenty-four months of the purchase or subscription. See Ana Novaes, Privatização do 
Setor de Telecomunicações no Brasil, in A PRIVATIZAÇÃO NO BRASIL:  O CASO DOS SERVIÇOS 
DE UTILIDADE PÚBLICA 145, 151 (2000). 
 112. Id. at 153. 
 113. For a model showing the exponential increase in agency costs in controlling-
minority structures, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and 
Dual Class Equity:  The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow 
Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall Morck ed., 2000). 
 114. See Bruno Rocha & Iam Muniz, Casos Brasileiros, in GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA 
NO BRASIL E NO MUNDO 73, 82 (Ricardo P. C. Leal et al. eds., 2002). 
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substantial premiums to majority shareholders and at the expense of the 
minority.  Examples of abusive sale-of-control transactions in the electric-
power industry alone include Coelba (purchased for R$165 per controlling 
share against R$62 offered to the minority), CPFL (in which controlling 
shareholders received R$432 per share compared to R$126 offered for the 
public float) and Cesp Paranapanema (acquired for R$34 per controlling 
share against R$9 paid to the minority).115
Tatiana Nenova’s empirical study on the impact of Law 9,457 on the 
level of private benefits finds that control value more than doubled 
following the enactment of the statute, reflecting greater opportunities for 
minority expropriation under the new regime.
 
116  By encouraging abusive 
going-private transactions, the statute led to a sharp reduction in the number 
of listed firms in Brazilian capital markets and eroded investor confidence 
in new issues.  The trading volume on the São Paulo Stock Exchange fell 
from more than US$191 billion in 1997 to $65 billion in 2001.117  Between 
1995 and 2000, only eight companies went public on the São Paulo Stock 
Exchange.118
In December 2000, the São Paulo Stock Exchange launched the Novo 
Mercado (New Market), a voluntary premium exchange segment whose 
listing standards imposed much stricter corporate governance rules than 
those provided under Brazilian law, including the extension of tag-along 
rights to minority investors at the same price paid to controlling 
shareholders in the event of a sale of control.
 
119  Understanding the political 
clout of controlling shareholders in blocking legal reforms, this approach to 
capital market development followed what Ronald Gilson, Henry 
Hansmann, and I term “regulatory dualism”:  it permitted established firms 
to continue to be governed by the existing legal regime, while creating a 
parallel system of stricter shareholder protection that is open to firms that 
voluntarily choose to adopt it.120  By preserving the interests of established 
firms—which, despite the wave of privatizations, continued to include a 
number of giant SOEs, such as Banco do Brasil and Petrobras—regulatory 
dualism helped overcome the political economy constraints to investor 
protection reform and, ultimately, capital market development.121
 
 115. Mark Mobius, Getting Brazil to Clean Up Its Act, LATIN FIN., Dec. 2000, at 76. 
  
Interestingly, SOEs were among the first to go public on the Novo 
 116. Tatiana Nenova, Control Values and Changes in Corporate Law in Brazil 4 (Sept. 
25, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=294064. 
 117. See História do Mercado de Capitais, PORTAL DO INVESTIDOR, 
http://www.portaldoinvestidor.gov.br/InvestidorEstrangeiro/OMercadodeValoresMobili%C3
%A1riosBrasileiro/Hist%C3%B3riadoMercadodeCapitais/tabid/134/Default.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 118. See Santana, supra note 109, at 7. 
 119. The role of the specific contributions of the Novo Mercado for the subsequent 
development of the Brazilian capital markets has been described in greater length elsewhere. 
See generally Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 88. 
 120. See id. at 478. 
 121. Id. 
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Mercado, arguably as part of a strategy pursued by incumbent politicians to 
insulate such firms from future political interference by their successors by 
binding them to a stronger investor protection regime.122
The dramatic expansion of Brazil’s capital market—which is now among 
the most active equity markets worldwide—has not entailed a decline in the 
SOE sector.
 
123  On the contrary, the recent discovery of new oilfields off 
the Brazilian coast is illustrative both of the continued vitality of mixed 
enterprises in emerging economies and of the distinctive behavior of the 
state as controlling shareholder of Petrobras, Brazil’s giant oil corporation.  
While the federal government owned the oilfields in their entirety, Brazil’s 
oil company Petrobras was state-controlled but 60 percent owned by private 
(including foreign) investors, which meant that the profits resulting from 
Petrobras’s exploration of the new fields would need to be shared with 
outside stockholders.124
The approach taken was for the government to assign to Petrobras its 
rights in the oil reserves in exchange for additional company shares.  This 
stock issue, in turn, took place in connection with a public equity offering 
designed to raise additional outside capital to fund the necessary 
investments in drilling and exploration.  In order to circumvent the 
provisions of the Corporations Law requiring minority shareholder approval 
of stock subscriptions that are payable in kind, Petrobras’s lawyers 
structured both operations as separate transactions—even though they were 
described in the same legal document and openly referred to as a single 
transaction for the “capitalization” of Petrobras.
 
125
The result was a high-profile self-dealing transaction in which the 
interests of the Brazilian public as indirect beneficiaries of the 
government’s oil and equity holdings were pitted against the economic 
interests of Petrobras’s minority (and mostly foreign) investors.  
Commentators were concerned that the government would sell the oil, of 
which it was a 100 percent owner, at an inflated price to the company, of 
which the government owned only about 40 percent of the equity—hence 
transferring wealth from the company’s noncontrolling public shareholders 
to the government.
 
126
 
 122. See Thomas Kenyon, Socializing Policy Risk:  Capital Markets as Political 
Insurance 3 (2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=896562 
(arguing that governments opted to list state-owned firms on premium corporate governance 
standards “primarily to raise the political cost of potentially damaging actions by public 
shareholders”).  See infra note 
  In September 2010, the government finally set the 
price per barrel at US$8.51—a median figure between the price of $5 or $6 
262 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion. 
 123. Banco do Brasil’s major equity offering in 2010 illustrates that, despite clear 
evidence of use of the bank to pursue social and political goals during the financial crisis, the 
state continues to use private investment to fund firms that it controls. See John Paul 
Rathbone & Andrew Downie, Banco do Brasil Looks to Raise $6bn, FIN. TIMES, June 30, 
2010, at 17. 
 124. See Petrobras:  Over a Barrel, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2010, at 70. 
 125. Mauro Rodrigues da Cunha, A Capitalização da Petrobras é Prejudicial aos 
Acionistas Minoritários?, 84 REVISTA CAPITAL ABERTO (2010). 
 126. Petrobras:  Over a Barrel, supra note 124, at 70. 
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per barrel defended by minority investors and the price of $10 or $12 
initially hinted at by the government.127  The set price likely reflected a 
delicate balance between political and economic considerations.  On the one 
hand, self-dealing by the government is politically popular, which in itself 
constitutes a strong reason for expropriating minority shareholders in a 
presidential election year.128
Petrobras’s record share offering was completed in September 2010. By 
raising approximately US$67 billion, it became the largest share offering in 
history.
  On the other hand, Petrobras’s need for 
capital to finance the exploration of the new reserves likely deterred the 
government from setting an overly inflated price, since the company’s 
simultaneous stock offering could be jeopardized by such a serious abuse of 
minority investors.  What is perhaps most worrisome is that a transaction 
structure designed to address national interests in a high-profile SOE 
transaction may well set a precedent for what constitutes permissible 
related-party transactions under Brazil’s Corporations Law. 
129  Following the offering, the São Paulo Stock and Futures 
Exchange (BM&F Bovespa) became the world’s second-largest stock 
exchange by market capitalization.130  Buyers of Petrobras’s stock included 
Brazilian and foreign investors, who considered that the risks of 
government abuse of outside shareholders were outweighed and mitigated 
by the sheer size of the company’s oil reserves and its likely need to access 
capital markets again in the near future,131 although other investors deemed 
the offering overvalued and warned against a bubble.132  Interestingly, the 
government’s ownership stake in Petrobras actually increased as a 
consequence of this offering (from about 40 percent to 48 percent of the 
company’s total equity), showing that the state’s role as a shareholder, and 
its interest in an inefficiently weak corporate governance regime, are not 
going away in the near future.133
C.  China 
 
China is home to the most recent large-scale experiment with listed 
SOEs.  In the 1990s, a large number of Chinese state-owned firms, which 
 
 127. Id.; Rodrigues da Cunha, supra note 125. 
 128. Petrobras:  Over a Barrel, supra note 124, at 72 (“With elections due on October 
3rd, Brazil’s government was anxious to avoid the accusations of selling the country short 
that would have followed had it set an investor-pleasing price for the oil.”). 
 129. See Jonathan Wheatley, Petrobras Offering Raises $67bn, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 24, 
2010), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/22437018-c778-11df-aeb1-00144feab
49a.html. 
 130. See Vincent Bevins, Caution and Tough Regulation Are All-Weather Assets, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at 4. 
 131. See Herbert Lash, Analysis:  Petrobras Sale Draws Foreign Buyers Despite Risks, 
REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/23/us-petrobras-
investors-idUSTRE68M4SV20100923. 
 132. Alexander Ragir, Mobius Calls Petrobras Offering an “Abomination,” May 
Represent a “Bubble,” BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-09-24/mobius-calls-petrobras-offering-an-abomination-may-represent-a-bubble-.html. 
 133. See Wheatley, supra note 129. 
2012] STATE OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2943 
until then were operated by government agencies, were transformed into 
business corporations.  At the same time that most of the Western world 
was undertaking standard privatization programs, the Chinese government 
embraced “corporatisation” as an integral part of its economic 
modernization strategy.134  While some observers saw in the 
corporatization strategy a first step in the transition toward private control 
of enterprise, the goal of the Communist Party was arguably the reverse, 
that is, to increase state control of economic activity through leverage.135
The Shanghai Stock Exchange opened in 1990 with IPOs of a number of 
SOEs.
 
136  Between 1991 and 1998, more than 600 firms that were 
previously wholly owned by the government went public in China.137  As 
was the case in a number of capitalist economies in previous decades, 
minority interests in many of the newly corporatized SOEs were publicly 
traded and listed on national (and, increasingly, international) stock 
exchanges.  By 1999, a typical listed SOE in China had just over 60 percent 
of its equity held by the government in the form of non-tradable shares, 
with the remainder of the firm’s stock being listed on the exchange and held 
by private investors.138  A 2005 legal reform allowed for the conversion of 
non-tradable into tradable shares, a change that is expected to gradually 
eliminate China’s two-tier share structure.139
While state-owned firms still dominate Chinese capital markets, the 
relative participation of entirely private issuers has been growing in recent 
years.  The proportion of companies traded in Chinese exchanges having 
the state as a major or controlling shareholder has declined, from about 97 
percent in 1997 to roughly 75 percent in 2003 and 60 percent in 2007, but 
 
 
 134. Cyril Lin, Corporatisation and Corporate Governance in China’s Economic 
Transition, 34 ECON. PLAN. 5, 6 (2001). 
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CHINA ECON. REV. 451, 453 (2003). 
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Under an Uncertain Legal Regime 6 (Mar. 28, 2002) (unpublished JSD Dissertation, Yale 
Law School) (on file with Lillian Goldman Library, Yale Law School). 
 138. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition 
Economies:  Lessons from China, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 184, 188 (2005) (citing CSRC data 
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 139. See James Ahn & David Cogman, A Quiet Revolution in China’s Capital Markets, 
MCKINSEY Q., Summer 2007, at 18, 20. 
2944 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
remains significant.140  As of mid-2010, the top ten state-owned firms made 
up almost 40 percent of the Shanghai Stock Exchange market 
capitalization.141
As in other jurisdictions, the presence of the state as the dominant 
shareholder in the economy has had a profound impact on the nature and 
structure of China’s corporate and securities laws.  China’s Company Law 
of 1994, enacted in response to the ongoing corporatization process, was 
designed with the needs and objectives of SOEs in mind.  As in other 
jurisdictions, however, China’s Company Law applied to government and 
privately controlled firms alike, with the result that the interests of the state 
as a shareholder imposed negative externalities on the legal regime 
available to private firms.  In his overview of corporate governance 
practices in China, Donald Clarke encapsulates the problem by noting that 
 
the need to provide for the special circumstances of state sector 
enterprises ends up hijacking the entire Company Law so that instead of 
state sector enterprises being made more efficient by being forced to 
follow the rules for private sector enterprises (the original ambition), 
potential private sector enterprises are hamstrung by having to follow 
rules that make sense only in a heavily state-invested economy.142
State interests have molded China’s original corporate laws—hence 
making them ill-adapted to private sector corporations—through numerous 
different channels.  First, China’s 1994 Company Law was largely 
mandatory, rather than enabling, in nature.  Tailored to the needs of recently 
corporatized state firms, China’s corporate laws—which included specific 
legal mandates about the reinvestment of profits and the minimum and 
maximum number of board members—offered a regime that was overly 
rigid and therefore dysfunctional when applied to privately owned 
companies.
 
143
The shortcomings of China’s corporate laws were even more serious 
when it came to shareholder protection, a failure that earned Chinese capital 
markets the reputation for being “worse than a casino.”
 
144  According to an 
OECD report on corporate governance practices in China, Chinese stock 
markets were rife with cases of abuse by the state, as controlling 
shareholder, by means of related party transactions.145
 
 140. See Lin, supra note 
  Although on paper, 
Chinese law allocated significant power to shareholders—such as the right 
134, at 24 (for 1997); OECD, CHINA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:  
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 314 (2005) (for 2003); Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, 
Reputational Sanctions in China’s Securities Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 938 (2008) 
(for 2007). 
 141. William T. Allen & Han Shen, Assessing China’s Top-Down Securities Markets 8 
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper 
No. 10-70, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1648336. 
 142. Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China:  An Overview, 14 CHINA ECON. 
REV. 494, 495 (2003). 
 143. See id. at 501. 
 144. OECD, supra note 140, at 314. 
 145. Id. 
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to monitor firm management and to make decisions about dividend 
distributions—in practice, these provisions served to protect the 
government as a controlling shareholder while denying meaningful legal 
rights to minority investors.146  Prominent scholars argued that, despite the 
lack of legal protection for minority investors, extralegal substitutes existed 
in China to encourage the adoption of reasonable corporate governance 
practices.147
Subsequent developments concerning the admissibility and requirements 
of securities actions in China provide a paradigmatic example of how the 
interests of the state as a shareholder can hinder the enforcement of investor 
rights.  Confronting a then-recent rise in the number of private securities 
actions filed in Chinese courts, the Supreme People’s Court of China issued 
a notice in 2001 directing lower courts to temporarily suspend the filing of 
securities lawsuits.
  Still, extralegal substitutes, while helpful, are often 
imperfect—and, given the prominence of the state’s interests as a 
controlling shareholder in a large number of listed firms, significant legal 
improvements are unlikely to be forthcoming. 
148  A series of interviews conducted by Zhiwu Chen 
revealed that one of the main reasons behind the suspension of securities 
litigation in China was the Court’s concern that these lawsuits, if successful, 
could bring about major financial losses to the state as the controlling 
shareholder of most corporate defendants.149
In 2002, the Supreme People’s Court lifted the general suspension and 
issued a new set of rules to govern private securities litigation in China.  
Although praised by the domestic media, foreign commentators viewed the 
new regulations as posing “several daunting obstacles” to plaintiffs in 
securities lawsuits against both state and private corporations.
 
150
 
 146. See Yu, supra note 
  In 
addition to other procedural and substantive requirements, the regulations 
made the filing of securities lawsuits conditional on the prior imposition of 
administrative or criminal penalties by the government, hence significantly 
weakening the prospects of successful initiation of securities fraud claims 
expressly contemplated by Chinese securities laws.  The result is that 
conflicts of interest stemming from the state’s stockholdings—which were 
137, at 76. 
 147. See generally Franklin Allen et al., Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China, 
77 J. FIN. ECON. 57 (2005) (stating that China has low levels of investor protection, 
underdeveloped capital markets, and corporate control concentrated in the hands of the state 
or founders’ families). But see Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 140, at 977 (asserting that 
Chinese stock exchanges’ application of shaming sanctions helps promote good corporate 
governance in the absence of a strong legal environment); Pistor & Xu, supra note 138, at 
196–206 (arguing that China’s system of administrative governance through the quota 
system compensates for the deficiencies of legal governance protections). 
 148. For a detailed discussion of securities litigation developments in China, see Walter 
Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China:  Material Disclosure About China’s Legal 
System?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 599 (2003). 
 149. See Chen, supra note 136, at 465.  Other stated reasons for the suspension included 
concerns about a massive inflow of securities cases, a lack of expertise to address the suits, 
and the risk of conflicting decisions. Id. at 640. 
 150. Hutchens, supra note 148, at 599. 
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probably a key driving force behind the new rules—are likely to frustrate 
private enforcement efforts, since “the Chinese state will most likely not 
authorize massive litigation against itself or its assets on a routine basis.”151
In 2005, China’s corporations and securities statutes underwent a major 
overhaul, which, according to some commentators, changed the existing 
statute “almost beyond recognition.”
 
152  In a few respects, the revisions 
eliminated previously existing shareholder protections, such as a mandatory 
bid rule at a “fair price” upon the acquisition of a 30 percent stake in a 
firm.153  But in more fundamental respects, the revisions promised greatly 
improved protection for the rights of public shareholders.  The new rules 
imposed fiduciary duties on managers and controlling shareholders, 
required listed firms to have independent directors, permitted derivative 
suits, and recommended (but did not mandate) cumulative voting.154
Different factors help explain the recent improvements in minority 
shareholder rights in China in the face of massive government ownership 
and the attendant conflicts of interest.  First, Chinese authorities and the 
branches of government that control business corporations are to a degree 
separated, either fortuitously or by design, from the authorities that make 
and enforce corporate and capital markets law.  While local authorities have 
an interest in exploiting the minority shareholders of the firms they control, 
the central government and its agencies—including the increasingly active 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)—is often keen to rein 
in abusive behavior by powerful local actors and foster capital market 
development.
 
155
Second, even though private (and government) controlled corporations in 
China are largely subject to the same unitary legal regime, there is growing 
evidence of a differentiated approach in enforcement.  China’s emerging 
takeover regulation permits the CSRC to exempt certain transactions from 
existing rules, hence selectively favoring the state’s interests in merging 
state-owned firms to create national champions.
 
156  Additionally, even 
though SOEs dominate China’s capital markets, they receive sanctions from 
the CSRC less frequently than do private firms.157
 
 151. Id. at 640. 
  A recent event study 
 152. See, e.g., Nicholas Calcina Howson, The Doctrine that Dared Not Speak Its Name:  
Anglo-American Fiduciary Duties in China’s 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations 
of Prior Convergence, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 193, 193 
(Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2008). 
 153. Xin Tang, Protecting Minority Shareholders in China:  A Task for Both Legislation 
and Enforcement, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA, supra note 
152, at 145. 
 154. See id. at 143. 
 155. See Nicholas C. Howson, Private Shareholders’ Suits in the People’s Republic of 
China:  Making “Rule of Law” from the Bottom Up 26–27 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) (describing the role of the CSRC in pushing for the increased 
availability of private shareholder suits in China). 
 156. Armour et al., supra note 12, at 80. 
 157. Allen & Shen, supra note 141, at 21 (warning that the possibility that SOEs are more 
law abiding cannot be discarded). 
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provides evidence of China’s dual approach to enforcement.  It found that 
only private firms experienced large abnormal returns around the 
announcement of regulatory changes designed to improve minority investor 
protection in China, thus suggesting that investors do not expect regulators 
to enforce these more stringent standards against SOEs.158  Moreover, the 
2008 Law on State-Owned Assets of Enterprises grants to the State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)—China’s 
central holding company, and arguably the world’s “largest controlling 
shareholder”159—control rights that are superior to those available to 
private shareholders under the Company Law.160
Finally, despite these formal improvements to the “law on the books,” the 
extent to which the new regime will effectively protect minority investors 
remains to be seen.  Shortcomings in enforcement—which are certainly 
compounded when the state is the controlling shareholder—may undermine 
most protections formally conferred by the statute.
  Although this dual 
standard is often the subject of criticism, it likely helps to mitigate the 
interests of the state as controlling shareholder in the development of the 
general corporate law regime. 
161  For instance, Donald 
Clarke and Nicholas Howson have noted that, notwithstanding the new 
provisions in China’s 2006 Company Law expressly permitting derivative 
action, derivative suits involving publicly traded corporations remain 
virtually non-existent, a phenomenon that they attribute to the courts’ 
reluctance to accept politically charged cases.162
While the overt influence of the interests of the state as a controlling 
shareholder on China’s corporate governance environment have been 
sufficiently conspicuous to attract the attention of legal and economic 
scholars of Chinese capital markets,
 
163
 
 158. See generally Henk Berkman, Rebel A. Cole & Lawrence J. Fu, Political 
Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection:  Evidence from Securities-Market 
Regulation in China, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1391 (2011). 
 this phenomenon is hardly unique to 
China; rather, it is widespread among jurisdictions where the state serves 
simultaneously as shareholder and corporate governance regulator.  The 
state’s pervasive presence in the Chinese economy has only made more 
severe a problem that is equally common, if more subtle, in Western 
economies where mixed enterprise plays a significant role. 
 159. Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 135, at 45. 
 160. See id. at 43 (noting that share transfers involving SOEs require the approval of 
SASAC even in situations in which controlling shareholders would not have veto rights 
under the Company Law). 
 161. Tang, supra note 153, at 147 (“Protections for the minority shareholders on the 
books do not seem bad, but legal enforcement remains a problem.”). 
 162. See Donald C. Clarke & Nicholas H. Howson, Pathway to Minority Shareholder 
Protection:  Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China 40 (Sept. 30, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 163. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 135, at 30; Lin, supra note 134, at 26–27. 
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D.  Continental Europe 
State-owned enterprises, including mixed enterprises, figured 
prominently in twentieth-century Europe.  By 1977, nineteen (38 percent) 
of the top fifty largest industrial companies in Europe were state-owned, 
and nine (18 percent) of them were mixed enterprises.164  While the top 
fifty included a number of British companies (including wholly owned state 
corporations), eight of the nine largest mixed enterprises were Italian, 
German, or French.165
1.  Italy 
  The following vignettes of historical developments 
in Italy, Germany, and France illustrate the extent to which the interests of 
the state as a shareholder may have influenced the content of corporate laws 
in those jurisdictions. 
Historically, controlling families and the state have dominated the 
corporate landscape in Italy.  As capital markets declined after a 1907 
liquidity crisis, the state gradually took over industries that had previously 
been run by private companies, such as railroads, banks, and insurance.  In 
the 1930s, adverse economic conditions prompted an even greater incursion 
of the state into business activity.  Established in 1933, the Istituto per la 
Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) became the government-owned holding 
company of the state’s equity interests in various banks and industrial 
corporations, including listed firms.166  Although initially envisioned as a 
temporary response to economic emergency, both state and family control 
of corporations thereafter reached a stable equilibrium for most of the 
twentieth century.  Mixed enterprise was quite significant in twentieth-
century Italy, accounting for 18 percent of the number of listed firms and 
over 25 percent of total market capitalization by 1992.167
As the Italian system of corporate governance consolidated into a model 
of state and family capitalism, attempts to increase investor protection and 
develop capital markets stalled.  In their empirical study of the evolution of 
corporate ownership in Italy, Alexander Aganin and Paolo Volpin find that, 
after controlling for other relevant channels, the development of the Italian 
stock market has been positively correlated with investor protection and 
openness, and negatively correlated with government intervention.
 
168
 
 164. Public Sector Enterprise:  The State in the Market, ECONOMIST, Dec. 30, 1978, at 51. 
  They 
also note that the greatest improvements in investor protection in Italy 
 165. The other top mixed enterprise at that time was British Petroleum, previously a 
wholly owned corporation that had then recently begun to be privatized by the U.K. 
government. 
 166. For an excellent description of the evolution of corporate governance and ownership 
structures in Italy, see Guido Ferrarini, Corporate Governance Changes in the 20th Century:  
A View from Italy (European Corporate Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Law, 
Working Paper No. 29, 2005). 
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and Outstanding Issues, in PRIVATIZATION EXPERIENCES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 225, 256 
(Marko Köthenbürger et al. eds., 2006). 
 168. Aganin & Volpin, supra note 11, at 342. 
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occurred at precisely the same time as the state was retreating from 
corporate ownership during the privatization process, since “[t]he 
government coupled the sale of assets with substantial improvement of the 
legal protection for minority shareholders.”169  The authors interpret this 
finding as evidence that state ownership operates as a substitute for capital 
markets, arguing that “[d]irect intervention by the state as an entrepreneur 
partially replaced and crowded out the role of the private sector in the 
accumulation of capital.”170
The potential of the state as controlling shareholder to influence 
corporate lawmaking provides another possible causal link between state 
presence and legal protection of investors, which, in turn, facilitates capital 
market development.  The Italian case, however, raises the question of why 
the interests of the government as a selling shareholder in the privatization 
process contributed to greater investor protection and capital market 
development in Italy when it had precisely the opposite effect in Brazil.  
One possible explanation—namely, that the Italian government was more 
inclined to respect minority shareholder rights to begin with—does not find 
support in the evidence.  In the late 1980s and the 1990s, Italian law 
permitted controlling shareholders, including the state, to extract 
extraordinary levels of private benefits to the detriment of minority 
investors.
 
171
For example, Zingales provides strong anecdotal evidence suggesting 
that, like private controlling shareholders, the Italian government profited 
handsomely by engaging in abusive related party transactions to the 
detriment of minority investors.  In 1992, the IRI, which is 100 percent 
owned by the Italian government, transferred its 83.3 percent equity stake in 
software company Finsiel to the telecommunications group STET, a mixed 
enterprise that is 47 percent owned by small investors but also controlled by 
the IRI.
 
172  Despite the fact that, due to then-new EEC regulations, Finsiel 
was soon to lose its monopoly position and face increased competition, the 
company was priced at fifty times its earnings—a generous valuation 
compared to a standard multiple of twenty or thirty in similar international 
transactions.173  STET’s stock price fell by 20 percent upon the 
announcement of the transaction.174
 
 169. Id. at 326. 
  Zingales estimates that this single 
transaction resulted in a wealth transfer from minority shareholders to the 
 170. Id. 
 171. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control:  An International 
Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 551 (2004) (finding that Italy had an estimated level of private 
benefits of control of 37 percent of firm value, compared to 65 percent in Brazil); Luigi 
Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right:  A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience, 7 
REV. FIN. STUD. 125, 127 (1994) (finding that in Italy, private benefits of control were worth 
more than 60 percent of the value of the non-voting stock). 
 172. Zingales, supra note 171, at 146. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. 
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government in the amount of at least US$110 million, or 7 percent of the 
equity value held by outside investors.175
Another possible explanation for the divergent outcomes in Brazil and 
Italy is the difference in the number and scale of enterprise under whole 
versus partial state ownership in the two countries—the theory being that 
greater private capital participation in SOEs increases incentives for 
minority expropriation, while a sale of wholly owned subsidiaries makes it 
impossible for the state to maximize revenue by tinkering with the intra-
shareholder distribution of sales proceeds, and therefore encourages the 
adoption of measures that maximize firm value.  Since Brazil’s largest and 
most profitable state-owned firms were publicly traded (such as telecom 
Telebras and mining firm Vale do Rio Doce), the government stood to 
profit by abusing minority investors when selling control of the firm.  By 
contrast, a number of important SOEs to be privatized in Italy were still 
wholly owned subsidiaries of the state and organized under public law, thus 
allowing the government to internalize the benefits of an improved 
corporate governance environment in the form of higher sales proceeds.
 
176
The stated goals of the privatization process in Brazil and Italy are still 
another factor that may account for the different outcomes in the two 
jurisdictions.  Brazil’s privatization statute listed a number of competing 
objectives—such as the reduction of public debt through privatization 
proceeds and the development of capital markets—without establishing any 
order of priority.
 
177  Conversely, Italy’s privatization program listed greater 
corporate efficiency, increases in market competition, and the development 
of financial markets as its three main goals.178  Increased fiscal revenues 
and reduction of public debt were specifically ranked as “residual” 
objectives.179
Finally, there were more public share issue privatizations—as opposed to 
a private sale by the government of a controlling block of shares—in Italy 
than in Brazil, perhaps because Italy’s policymakers placed a higher priority 
on capital market development as one of the goals of the privatization 
process.  Although there were a number of block sales to strategic investors 
in the early 1990s, public share offerings became the dominant sales 
method in Italy after 1994.
  This suggests that, given the opportunity of expropriating 
minority shareholders, privatizations of mixed enterprises may be more 
conducive to the enactment of laws that improve investor protection and 
corporate governance standards precisely when revenue maximization is not 
the foremost objective. 
180
 
 175. Id. at 147. 
  Also, maximizing sales proceeds through 
public offerings requires increased investor confidence, which in turn 
 176. Goldstein, supra note 167, at 226–27. 
 177. See supra Part I.B. 
 178. Goldstein, supra note 167, at 228. 
 179. Bernardo Bortolotti, Italy’s Privatization Process and Its Implications for China 10 
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series, Working Paper No. 118.05, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=833265. 
 180. Goldstein, supra note 167, at 233. 
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encouraged the government to promote legal reforms that improved 
protections for minority investors.181
However, despite recent corporate governance improvements
   
182 and the 
implementation of a large-scale and generally successful privatization 
program, the continued presence of the government as a shareholder in Italy 
provides reason for concern.183  If, at €121.3 billion, the aggregate revenues 
of Italy’s privatizations are significant by international standards, the share 
of proceeds resulting from control transfers (€50.4 billion) presents a 
different picture.184  Although the state’s overall equity interest in publicly 
traded companies has nearly halved since the 1990s (from 18 percent of 
market capitalization in 1990 to 9.5 percent in 2005), the Italian 
government’s control of listed firms remains significant despite the wave of 
privatizations.185  By 2001, listed firms controlled by the Italian 
government still accounted for 22.4 percent of total market capitalization 
(down from 45 percent in 1996),186
2.  Germany 
 which suggests that the conflict of 
interest stemming from the state’s dual role as shareholder and regulator is 
likely to persist.  
In the twentieth century, mixed enterprises (gemischtwirtschaftliche 
Unternehmen) were first popularized in Germany but later spread rapidly 
across Europe and beyond.  Interestingly, Germany is widely recognized as 
the birthplace of modern institutional theories of the business corporation, 
according to which the purpose of the firm is not merely to maximize 
shareholder value, but rather to satisfy the public interest.  While the 
relationship between theories of corporate purpose and ownership structure 
is certainly complex, it is at least suggestive that conceptions of the 
corporation as a state-like entity in charge of promoting the public good 
first gained ascendancy precisely in the jurisdiction that led the way in the 
use of mixed enterprises. 
The interests of the government as a shareholder have played a visible 
role in Germany’s corporate lawmaking process.  A 1965 corporate law 
reform failed to outlaw the issuance of multi-voting stock due to strong 
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opposition from local governmental authorities, who used special shares to 
exert a degree of control disproportionate to their capital contributions.187  
The self-interests of local governments prevented reform in the direction of 
one-share, one-vote until as late as 1998, and even then was overcome only 
by creating a special set of exceptions for governmental enterprise.  The 
reform as enacted was the result of a political compromise.188  While the 
Law on Transparency and Control in Corporations (Gesetz zur Kontrolle 
und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG)) of 1998 prohibited 
voting caps and multi-voting rights, contrary provisions contained in special 
statutes on mixed enterprises—notably the Volkswagen law, which 
imposed voting caps and granted veto rights to the State of Lower 
Saxony—remained unaffected by the new legislation.189
The interests of the German government as a shareholder also played an 
important part in the promotion of a “shareholder culture” in connection 
with its privatization process in the 1990s, of which the record-breaking 
IPO of Deutsche Telekom, in what was the largest public offering in 
European history, is a prominent example.  A key government objective 
behind the sale of its stake in Deutsche Telekom was to maximize revenue 
in order to help Germany meet the budget requirements for the Economic 
and Monetary Union.
 
190  Nevertheless, as in Italy, but in sharp contrast to 
Brazil, the profit-maximizing ambitions of the German government led it to 
support, rather than suppress, outside investor rights.191
The more benign role of the German government in the corporate 
governance reform process was not the product of good intentions alone, 
but rather was facilitated by the ownership structure of the firms to be 
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discussion of the case and its legal implications, see Wolf-Georg Ringe, Company Law and 
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privatized.  In Brazil, the crown jewels among the SOEs were already listed 
on the exchange and had a substantial number (often a majority) of public 
shareholders, which permitted the government to profit financially by 
exploiting the minority and appropriating the control premium to itself.  By 
contrast, Deutsche Telekom was previously a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Germany’s national government, and it soon became clear that a flotation of 
the company in a good corporate governance environment would maximize 
the government’s revenue from privatization.  As explained by Jeffrey 
Gordon, “Public shareholder protection thus became both politically 
popular and fiscally prudent.”192
3.  France 
  This suggests that privatization can lead 
the way to corporate law reform in general, above and beyond any 
improvements in the management of companies that are privatized. 
Famous for its dirigiste approach to economic policy, France boasted a 
large number of mixed enterprises (sociétés d’économie mixte) throughout 
the twentieth century.  Mixed enterprises first appeared in France in the 
interwar period in imitation of foreign (notably German) experience.193  
Some mixed enterprises date back to the 1920s, while others, such as 
Renault and Francolor, were taken over by the government as enemy 
property following World War II.194  The French government initially 
participated as a minority investor in the first mixed enterprises of the 
1920s, although majority state control gradually became the norm in most 
sociétés d’économie mixte in the following years.195
The interests of the French state as a shareholder have apparently 
impinged on the legal regime applicable to business corporations (sociétés 
anonymes).
 
196  The institutional orientation of France’s corporate law 
toward the “interests of the corporation” (intérêt social)—as opposed to the 
interests of shareholders that arguably dominate U.S. law—is well suited to 
SOEs.197
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  Furthermore, France’s peculiar regime of “tenured” double 
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voting rights—according to which corporate charters may confer double 
voting rights to registered shareholders who have held their shares for a 
minimum period of two to four years—is particularly responsive to the 
state’s interests as a shareholder.  Although the provision’s purpose is to 
give a loyalty premium to long-term shareholders, whose interests are 
supposedly better aligned with those of the company, a practical effect of 
this rule is to magnify the voting power of the state, which is invariably a 
long-term holder.198
As elsewhere, the wave of privatizations starting in the 1980s 
significantly reduced, but did not by any means eliminate, the state’s equity 
holdings.
 
199  Charter provisions conferring double voting rights remain 
standard practice among French corporations, despite evidence that they 
facilitate expropriation of minority shareholders.200  This rule also benefits 
controlling shareholders of private firms, who have fiercely resisted 
proposals to adopt an unqualified regime of one-share, one-vote.  The 
French government is said to have forcefully and successfully defended the 
exemption of double voting rights from the E.U. takeover directive, which 
otherwise prevents the use of multi-voting stock or capped voting as 
takeover defenses.201
II.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE WAVE OF PRIVATIZATIONS 
 
The foregoing case studies have illustrated how the interests of the state 
as a shareholder in different historical and legal contexts have played a key 
role in shaping the corporate law regimes applicable to both public and 
private firms.  This part speculates on whether and to what extent the 
(relative) retreat of state ownership worldwide following the wave of 
privatizations in the 1980s and 1990s has impacted the political economy of 
corporate governance and, consequently, the observed levels of capital 
market development. 
It is now well established that the implementation of privatization 
strategies and rising levels of capital market activity worldwide in the late 
1980s and 1990s were roughly contemporaneous.202
 
 198. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure, in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:  A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 33, 56 
(Reinier R. Kraakman et al. eds., 2004) (maintaining that the award of double voting rights 
“serves to deter takeovers and enhances the power of the state as shareholder”). 
  Just as the 
 199. See ORG. DE COOPÉRATION & DE DEV. ÉCON., ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES DE L’OCDE:  
FRANCE 44 (2005) (noting that even after the privatizations, the presence of state-owned 
enterprises in France is comparatively greater than in other OECD countries). 
 200. See generally Chiraz Ben Ali, Disclosure and Minority Expropriation:  A Study of 
French Listed Firms (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1406165 (finding an association between double voting rights 
and minority expropriation). 
 201. See Ben Clift, The Second Time as Farce?  The EU Takeover Directive, the Clash of 
Capitalisms and the Hamstrung Harmonization of European (and French) Corporate 
Governance, 41 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 55 (2009). 
 202. See Bernardo Bortolotti et al., Privatization and Stock Market Liquidity, 31 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 297, 298 (2007) (“A remarkable wealth of evidence shows the correlation 
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international wave of privatizations reached its apex, equity markets around 
the globe experienced unprecedented growth.  A study by Maria 
Boutchkova and William Megginson shows that the increase in market 
capitalization and liquidity levels in non-U.S. markets, where privatizations 
were most common, far exceeded the contemporaneous financial boom 
experienced in the United States.203  Non-U.S. markets saw a twelve-fold 
increase in market capitalization, and a twenty-fold increase in trading 
volumes, between 1983 and 1999.204  Increases in market capitalization and 
trading volumes in developing countries were even greater, at twenty-six 
times and ninety-two times, respectively, during the same period.205
While the privatization literature initially focused on the effects of 
ownership changes on firm-level performance, the temporal coincidence 
between the implementation of privatization strategies and the expansion of 
global equity markets has recently begun to attract scholarly attention.  To 
be sure, the association between privatization and capital market growth is 
hardly surprising.  The very withdrawal of the state as a source of equity 
and debt financing (through the privatization of government-owned banks) 
was reasonably expected to increase demand for private financing sources.  
Moreover, many, if not most, privatization programs were specifically 
devised to promote the development of local capital markets.
 
206  A number 
of jurisdictions opted to privatize state-owned firms through public share 
offerings or SIPs, in which the very divestiture of government 
shareholdings directly contributed to increase liquidity and market 
capitalization of local exchanges.  By mid-2000, all of the ten largest (and 
thirty out of the top thirty-four) stock offerings in history were the result of 
share issue privatizations.207
Nevertheless, the floating of SOEs on stock markets—which represents a 
direct contribution of privatizations to capital market development—
accounts for only a minor fraction of the growth in capital markets 
worldwide during the period.
 
208
 
between financial market development and privatization.”); Narjess Boubakri & Olfa 
Hamza, The Dynamics of Privatization, the Legal Environment and Stock Market 
Development, 16 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 304, 326–29 (2007) (finding that while 
privatizations have no simultaneous effect on the development of equity markets, it has a 
lagged effect of one or two years depending on the quality of the legal regime, the 
privatization method, and the intensity or depth of the privatization strategy). 
  A plausible but overlooked mechanism 
 203. See Maria K. Boutchkova & William L. Megginson, Privatization and the Rise of 
Global Capital Markets, 29 FIN. MGMT. 31 (2000) (discussing the development of capital 
markets worldwide during the 1990s, and the role played by share issue privatizations). 
 204. Id. at 35–36. 
 205. Id. at 36–37. 
 206. Id. at 31. 
 207. Id. at 50.  Bortolotti and colleagues find that share issue privatizations contribute to 
the development of capital markets by increasing market liquidity. See supra note 202. 
 208. Economists Enrico Perotti and Pieter van Oijen have provided some initial empirical 
evidence to suggest that privatizations have an indirect effect on capital market development 
by helping to lower “political risk.” See Enrico C. Perotti & Pieter van Oijen, Privatization, 
Political Risk and Stock Market Development in Emerging Economies, 20 J. INT’L MONEY & 
FIN. 43, 44 (2001). 
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through which privatizations might have indirectly contributed to capital 
market development is by facilitating the adoption of stronger investor 
protection laws.  The 1990s were not only the golden age of privatizations, 
but also a period of significant global convergence in corporate governance 
practices and corresponding improvements in the observed level of 
shareholder rights.  In a study of five large economies, John Armour and 
colleagues find that while the level of legal protection of minority 
shareholders was diverging until the late 1980s, there has been significant 
convergence toward greater investor protection since the mid-1990s—a 
trend that was not matched by similar levels of convergence in creditor 
rights and labor regulations.209
I want to raise the possibility that the privatization movement might have 
had the unintended consequence of improving the political economy of 
corporate law reforms in at least two ways.  First, as was the case in Italy 
and, to a lesser extent, Germany, the interests of the state as a selling 
shareholder in SIPs induced the government to improve investor protections 
so as to maximize its sales proceeds.  Second, even in cases like that of 
Brazil, where the state helped decrease investor protection to increase the 
control premium it was able to obtain in private sales of corporate control, 
privatizations might have had a lagged effect on the improvement of 
investor protection and the development of capital markets by reducing the 
magnitude of the state’s financial interests as a controlling shareholder and, 
consequently, of its vested interest in opposing minority shareholder rights.  
Thus far, even the economists’ laundry lists of the multiple benefits of 
privatization have overlooked the possible impact of the removal of the 
state as a major player in the political economy of corporate law reforms. 
 
Nevertheless, the long-term effects of the privatization sales of the 1990s 
on the political economy of corporate law reforms are likely to be 
ambiguous at best.  Many countries not only failed to eradicate state 
ownership in its entirety but even maintained or increased the existing 
number of publicly traded mixed enterprises by engaging in partial 
privatizations that floated minority equity interests in SOEs.  A recent study 
by Bernardo Bortolotti and Maria Faccio shows that governments remain 
the largest ultimate shareholder of one-third of “privatized” firms.210
 
 209. See, e.g., John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve?  Evidence from a Cross-
Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 
579, 620–28 (2009); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (proclaiming that “[t]here is no longer any 
serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-
term shareholder value,” and that “[t]his emergent consensus has already profoundly affected 
corporate governance practices throughout the world”). 
  While 
the state’s interest in maximizing revenue from partial privatizations may 
have supported the adoption of minority investor protections in the 1990s, 
the government’s continued financial stake in listed firms may lead it to 
disfavor further improvements in shareholder rights if no additional equity 
 210. See generally Bernardo Bortolotti & Mara Faccio, Government Control of Privatized 
Firms, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2907 (2009). 
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sales or issues are in sight.  This is especially so because, in a number of 
cases, the government remains the controlling shareholder by resorting to 
leveraging devices such as dual-class stock, pyramids, and the like, without 
holding a proportionate equity interest in the company—hence further 
increasing the incentives and opportunities for minority expropriation.211
III.  ADDRESSING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 
The previous parts showed how pervasive the conflicts of interest 
inherent in the government’s dual role as shareholder and regulator can be 
in a variety of historical and legal contexts.  This part will explore the 
potential of different institutional arrangements to mitigate the influence of 
the government as shareholder in corporate governance institutions.  Unlike 
more conventional instances of conflicts of interest, disclosure in this case 
is unlikely to provide an adequate remedy.  Changes to general corporate 
laws do not require a vote of the shareholders of the companies affected, 
while the citizenry is often sympathetic to laws that boost the state’s 
financial interests as a shareholder, be it by maintaining monopolies, as in 
the nineteenth-century U.S. or by favoring minority expropriation upon 
control sales as in twentieth-century Brazil. 
If disclosure is insufficient to eliminate the state’s conflicts of interest, a 
structural approach becomes necessary to prevent the special interests of the 
government as a shareholder from frustrating the enactment of an efficient 
legal regime.  Solutions to this problem invariably involve a tradeoff 
between the strength of the proposed remedy in eliminating the conflict and 
its political acceptability.  I will examine the promise and challenges of two 
main categories of institutional arrangements to address the conflicts of 
interest arising out of the state’s dual role as corporate governance player 
and referee:  ownership strategies and legal strategies.  Ownership strategies 
eliminate or mitigate the impact of the first role by improving the state’s 
incentives as a shareholder through a conscious choice among different 
corporate ownership structures.  Legal strategies take the existing 
ownership structure of state-owned enterprise as given, and instead seek to 
address the state’s second role as a general corporate governance regulator 
either by differentiating the corporate legal regime applicable to private 
firms and SOEs or by assigning regulatory authority to a private 
organization or foreign jurisdiction. 
A.  Ownership Strategies 
At least three ownership arrangements exist to mitigate the state’s 
conflicts of interest as shareholder and corporate governance regulator.  
Listed in order of decreasing effectiveness and increasing political 
acceptability, these approaches are:  (1) wholesale privatization, which 
 
 211. Id. at 2916 (noting that 52.38 percent of privatized firms in which the government 
remained the largest shareholder had leveraging devices, such as pyramids or dual-class 
shares) in place. 
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eradicates the conflict by eliminating in its entirety the state’s role as a 
shareholder; (2) whole (as opposed to mixed) ownership of SOEs, which 
eliminates the state’s interest in most governance rules typical of multi-
owner firms; and (3) minority (as opposed to controlling) shareholdings by 
the state, which may serve to align the government’s interests with those of 
outside investors in promoting corporate governance reforms. 
1.  Privatization 
A simple—indeed simplistic—solution is to describe the shareholder–
regulator conflict as yet another evil of state ownership of enterprise and 
join the numerous advocates in favor of privatization.  Although complete 
privatization of government stock holdings would certainly eliminate the 
state’s extra shareholder role, such a proposal is unlikely to be effective.  
While individual privatizations can have an almost immediate impact on 
firm-level performance, a transformation in the political economy of 
corporate lawmaking requires the state to relinquish ownership of a critical 
number of firms.  Yet recent experience demonstrates that this is more 
easily said than done, since even governments that undertook large-scale 
privatization programs often retain significant shareholdings in major listed 
corporations. 
State ownership has proven to be incredibly resilient in spite of the 
voluminous, if contentious, literature pointing to the comparative efficiency 
of private ownership.212
 
 212. For reviews of the empirical literature supporting the superiority of private 
ownership, see, for example, Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. 
FIN. 265, 290 (2002) (finding that higher government ownership of banks in the 1970s is 
associated with lower subsequent levels of financial development and economic growth); 
William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market:  A Survey of Empirical 
Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321, 380 (2001) (concluding that “privately owned 
firms are more efficient and more profitable than otherwise-comparable state-owned firms”); 
Shirley & Walsh, supra note 
  And, as the 2008 financial crisis made clear, 
pragmatic considerations in times of economic turmoil may lead to the 
emergence of state-owned enterprise even in inhospitable environments 
such as the United States.  It is therefore unlikely that recognizing state 
ownership’s indirect effects on the political economy of corporate 
lawmaking will tip the balance in favor of divestiture. 
17, at 51 (stating that out of fifty-two studies, thirty-two 
conclude that private and privatized firms significantly outperform public firms, fifteen do 
not find a significant link between ownership and performance, and five studies conclude 
that public firms perform better than private firms).  Nevertheless, a number of works have 
cast doubts on the inherent superiority of private versus public ownership of enterprise. See, 
e.g., Kole & Mulherin, supra note 22, at 11 (finding no significant differences between the 
performance of government-controlled companies and private sector firms in the same 
industry); Stephen Martin & David Parker, Privatization and Economic Performance 
Throughout the UK Business Cycle, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 225, 235–36 (1995) 
(finding no evidence that private ownership is inherently more efficient than state 
ownership); Clifford Zinnes et al., The Gains from Privatization in Transition Economies:  Is 
“Change of Ownership” Enough?, 48 IMF STAFF PAPERS 146, 146–48 (2001) (finding that 
privatization fails to produce economic performance improvements in the absence of deep 
institutional reforms). 
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2.  Whole Ownership of SOEs 
Falling short of privatization, a more politically acceptable alternative to 
isolate the effects of state equity holdings on the corporate governance 
environment is through the choice of ownership structure.  In order to 
mitigate the state’s conflicts of interest in corporate lawmaking, whole 
government ownership may in fact be preferable to partial ownership.  
From the perspective of the political economy of corporate governance, the 
benefits of state ownership of 100 percent of a firm’s equity holdings, as 
opposed to a lower threshold, are twofold.  First, in eliminating the typical 
agency problems associated with multi-owner firms, whole ownership 
neutralizes the government’s interest (and influence) in most legal 
provisions that govern the internal affairs rules of corporations.  Second, as 
described in the analysis of the Italian and German cases, whole ownership 
creates superior incentives for the implementation of efficient corporate 
governance rules upon control sales.  In the absence of expropriation 
opportunities against a non-existent minority, the government has an 
incentive to implement a legal regime that increases firm value in order to 
maximize its sales proceeds. 
Even if unconsciously, the United States adopted precisely this approach 
when it created numerous government-owned corporations in the twentieth 
century while eschewing mixed enterprises.213  Mixed enterprises were also 
less common in the United Kingdom compared to Germany, Italy, and 
France.214
In his 1937 study on government ownership, John Thurston noted that 
“the practice of governmental participation with private investors has not 
proved popular in the English-speaking countries.”
  Indeed, in the twentieth century, mixed enterprises—as opposed 
to wholly owned state enterprise—came to be more prevalent in countries 
traditionally labeled as belonging to the civil law tradition compared to 
common law countries. 
215  He observed that 
“[c]ontrary to the Continental practice, the English countries appear to favor 
entire rather than partial government control.”216
 
 213. See supra Part I.A. 
  Although an analysis of 
the relationship between the ownership structure of SOEs and a country’s 
legal tradition is outside the scope of this Article, the greater incidence of 
mixed enterprises in “civil law” jurisdictions seems to support the notion 
that the state’s interests as a shareholder might be an important but so far 
 214. See Stefan Grundmann & Florian Möslein, Golden Shares:  State Control in 
Privatised Companies:  Comparative Law, European Law and Policy Aspects 6 (Working 
Paper, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=410580 
(noting that Britain generally resorted to a system of total ownership by the state, while 
France, Italy, and Germany employed mixed enterprises to a greater extent). 
 215. JOHN THURSTON, GOVERNMENT PROPRIETARY CORPORATIONS IN THE ENGLISH-
SPEAKING COUNTRIES 5 (1937). 
 216. Id.  The reasons why mixed enterprises proved to be more popular in the civil law 
world were unknown to the author. Id. at 5–6 (“It is somewhat difficult to discover why the 
mixed corporation has not proved equally attractive in English-speaking countries.”). 
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neglected variable that can affect the level of a country’s investor 
protection. 
While the law-and-finance literature has argued that common law 
countries tend to boast greater capital market development and legal 
investor protection, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales’s work on the 
“Great Reversals” suggested that civil law jurisdictions were actually no 
less financially developed than common law countries in the early twentieth 
century.217  Subsequent work by economic historian Aldo Musacchio 
verified and corrected Rajan and Zingales’s figures, finding a significant 
degree of legal convergence worldwide around 1913, but no significant 
correlation between the level of financial development and a country’s legal 
tradition.218  Interestingly, the incidence of mixed enterprises in civil law 
countries for the most part postdates World War I.219
However, even if this development is relatively recent, it has since then 
proved to be enduring.  Bortolotti and Faccio’s survey of control structures 
prevailing after privatizations reveals that governments in civil law 
jurisdictions were far more likely to remain a controlling shareholder of 
“privatized” companies.  Strikingly, governments remained the largest 
blockholder in 48.5 percent of privatized companies in civil law 
jurisdictions, compared to only 4.6 percent in common law countries.
 
220  
The governments of common law countries were more likely to divest most 
of their equity holdings, even as they retained control over corporate affairs 
through a greater utilization of golden shares.221
In any event, a main lesson of this Article is that, from the perspective of 
the overall environment of corporate governance, it may be better if 
governments invest in industry as 100 percent owners rather than as partial 
owners together with private investors.  This lesson runs contrary to 
conventional wisdom in general, and to OECD recommendations in 
particular.  As put by a recent OECD report, “the listing of a minority stake 
in SOEs is considered a good practice both in establishing credibility and in 
 
 
 217. See generally Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals:  The 
Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003).  For 
representative works linking legal traditions to different levels of financial development, see 
supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Aldo Musacchio, Law and Finance c. 1900 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 16216, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1648016; see also Mariana Pargendler, Politics in the Origins:  The Making of 
Corporate Law in Nineteenth-Century Brazil, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 5–6) (showing that the distinction between common law and civil law 
jurisdictions was conspicuously absent from taxonomies of legal systems until well into the 
twentieth century). 
 219. See Pier Angelo Toninelli, The Rise and Fall of Public Enterprise, in THE RISE AND 
FALL OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 3, 18 (Pier Angelo Toninelli 
ed., 2000) (stating that the “great age of public enterprise” did not begin until after World 
War II). 
 220. Bortolotti & Faccio, supra note 210, at 2924. 
 221. Id. (noting that “[i]n common law countries, 86.5% of ﬁrms have outstanding golden 
shares, compared to only 49.2% of companies in civil law countries”). 
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dealing with a host of other corporate challenges.”222
Nevertheless, the benefits that whole over partial state ownership may 
bring to the political economy of corporate governance by eliminating the 
government’s conflict of interest will have to be balanced against the 
implications of different ownership structures for corporate performance.  
Intuitively, one may expect mixed enterprises to perform better than wholly 
owned government firms, as the former are subject to monitoring and 
pressures from private market participants from which the latter are 
immune.  The available empirical evidence on the relative efficiency of 
mixed enterprises versus wholly owned SOEs is mixed, but overall seems 
to provide mild support for the performance advantages of mixed 
enterprises.
  This point of view, 
however, pays insufficient attention to the political role of the state as a 
controlling shareholder and, therefore, its potential to undermine much-
needed investor protection reforms. 
223  Another advantage of mixed over whole ownership of SOEs 
is that the former permits the government to obtain information about 
enterprise value from the market price of the firm’s shares.  These 
efficiency advantages may in part explain why, despite obvious conflicts 
from a corporate governance standpoint, and despite numerous predictions 
of their imminent demise throughout the twentieth century,224
3.  The State as Minority Shareholder 
 mixed 
enterprises have proven to be remarkably durable. 
Most cases described above illustrate how the presence of the state as 
controlling shareholder can distort the political economy of corporate 
lawmaking to prevent the enactment of legal rights for minority investors.  
This raises a question as to what role the government may play in corporate 
governance reforms when it is not the controlling shareholder, but rather a 
minority shareholder that does not enjoy special prerogatives.  For the 
government to qualify as a minority shareholder, it must hold less (in fact, 
far less) than a majority of the firm’s shares, and not have special legal 
 
 222. OECD, SOES OPERATING ABROAD 12 (2009). 
 223. See Catherine C. Eckel & Aidan R. Vining, Elements of a Theory of Mixed 
Enterprise, 32 SCOT. J. POL. ECON. 82 (1985), for a theoretical model suggesting that mixed 
enterprises may perform better than SOEs, but worse than private firms.  For empirical 
works, see Boardman & Vining, supra note 17, at 26 (finding that wholly owned SOEs and 
mixed enterprises are both significantly less efficient than private firms, and that mixed 
enterprises are equally or less profitable than wholly owned SOEs); Sumit K. Majumdar, 
Assessing Comparative Efficiency of the State-Owned Mixed and Private Sectors in Indian 
Industry, 96 PUB. CHOICE 1, 13 (1998) (finding that the performance of private firms is 
superior to that of SOEs, with mixed enterprises falling in between); Aidan R. Vining & 
Anthony E. Boardman, Ownership Versus Competition:  Efficiency in Public Enterprise, 73 
PUB. CHOICE 205, 222 (1992) (finding that SOEs and mixed enterprises are less profitable 
than private companies, and that wholly owned SOEs are less profitable than mixed 
enterprises). 
 224. See, e.g., RIPERT, supra note 193, at 318 (condemning mixed enterprises as an 
attempt to “reconcile the irreconcilable”).  For a recent critique of hybrid firms, see The Rise 
of the Hybrid Company, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 2009, at 78. 
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rights (such as golden shares) or otherwise exercise de facto influence over 
the firm. 
If the government is indeed a minority shareholder and is otherwise 
unable to exercise informal control over management and obtain private 
benefits of control—and this is a big “if”—the cases analyzed throughout 
this Article suggest that minority state ownership could be more conducive 
to the adoption of legal investor protections than a system in which the 
government is the controlling shareholder.  In nineteenth-century Virginia, 
the financial interests of the state government as a minority shareholder 
were an important factor in the transition from highly regressive voting 
schemes to voting rules that bear greater proportion to equity ownership.225  
State-owned pension funds—perhaps most notably the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS)—have played an influential role 
in promoting higher corporate governance standards.226
B.  Legal Strategies 
  Future research is 
needed to elucidate the precise dynamics and political implications of state 
minority holdings, a subject that will be particularly useful for guiding 
public policy on domestic and international sovereign wealth funds. 
Even if it is impossible or undesirable to alter existing ownership 
structures of state-owned firms, other legal and institutional arrangements 
exist to mitigate the shareholder–regulator conflict.  One approach is to 
adopt separate corporate laws applicable only to the state as shareholder; 
another is to give foreign or non-state regulatory authorities the power to 
design and enforce corporate and securities regulations. 
1.  Dual Regulatory Regimes 
Compared to privatization, a less intrusive and politically more 
promising alternative is to address directly the negative externalities 
generated by state ownership on general corporate laws by creating a dual 
regulatory regime that supplies different rules for state and mixed 
corporations versus private enterprise.  The suggestion that government-
owned corporations should be governed by a different set of rules than 
those applicable to private sector companies is by no means novel.227
 
 225. See supra notes 
  The 
traditional rationale behind this proposal is that private firms and SOEs 
64–66 and accompanying text. 
 226. See, e.g., Diane Del Guercio & Jennifer Hawkins, The Motivation and Impact of 
Pension Fund Activism, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1999) (finding that activism by public pension 
funds is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization); Michael P. Smith, Shareholder 
Activism by Institutional Investors:  Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227 (1996) 
(examining various instances of shareholder activism by CalPERS, and finding that 
shareholder wealth increases in firms that adopt or settle the fund’s proposals). 
 227. For early instances of proposals for a separate statute for state-owned firms, see 
BREDIN, supra note 193, at 279 (France); Cretella, supra note 89, at 37 (Brazil). 
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have different functional characteristics and objectives and would therefore 
be best served by different legal regimes.228
A traditional economic rationale for state ownership is to exploit natural 
monopolies in a non-profit-maximizing fashion—so as to avoid the 
deadweight loss that would ensue if the monopoly were operated by a 
profit-maximizing private firm, which would presumably restrict output to 
allow for price and revenue increases.  Additional justifications for state 
ownership of enterprise include the pursuit of distributive, developmental, 
or other public policy goals.  It is therefore not difficult to see why a legal 
regime tailored to profit-maximizing firms may be inadequate to non-profit-
maximizing firms, and vice versa.  However, despite numerous 
recommendations to the contrary, separate corporate law statutes for state-
owned firms remain the exception, not the rule.
 
229
But there is another overlooked justification for establishing a distinct 
corporate regime for SOEs, which is to relieve state interests in corporate 
lawmaking.  As argued elsewhere, the creation of a dual regime can be a 
second-best solution when powerful political actors effectively block the 
enactment of a single efficient legal regime.
 
230
This proposal for a strict differentiation between the legal regime 
applicable to public and private firms is a variation on, rather than an 
instance of, regulatory dualism.  Under regulatory dualism, both old and 
new firms can freely choose between the old regime of low investor 
protection and the new regime of high investor protection.
  As a variation on regulatory 
dualism, the regime applicable to state-owned and private firms would be 
separate and different from the legal regime governing private sector 
corporations precisely to permit the private regime to develop along more 
efficient lines by exempting it from the interests and pressure of the 
government as shareholder. 
231  The benefits 
of this feature in lessening incumbents’ opposition to the new regime are at 
least twofold:  old firms can either continue to be governed by the old 
regime without the stigma associated with grandfathering, or opt for the 
more stringent new regime (and therefore obtain a lower cost of capital) if 
they are so willing.232
 
 228. Gilson, Hansmann, and I term this rationale for a dual regulatory regime “regulatory 
diversification,” which we define as occurring when “[t]he actors being regulated are not 
homogeneous in their needs for regulation,” so that efficiency requires “two or more parallel 
regimes of regulation, with each regime designed to deal with the particular characteristics of 
a distinct set of actors.” See Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 
  By contrast, the proposal for a dual and different 
regime for private and public firms in principle does not permit the 
88, at 480. 
 229. Among these exceptions are Israel and Argentina. See HÉCTOR CÁMARA, 
SOCIEDADES DE ECONOMÍA MIXTA (1954) (Argentina); Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 
1358–60 (Israel). 
 230. Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 88, at 475 (“Regulatory dualism [is a 
strategy that] seeks to mitigate political opposition to reforms by permitting the existing 
business elite to be governed by the old regime, while allowing other firms to be regulated 
by a new parallel regime that is more efficient.”). 
 231. See id. at 480–81. 
 232. Id. 
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government to opt into the private regime or allow controlling families to 
opt into the government regime.  As such, this proposal is less 
accommodating to the interests of the state and controlling families than a 
standard form of regulatory dualism and may therefore be less politically 
feasible.  To be sure, regulatory dualism and regulatory differentiation of 
public and private regimes are not mutually exclusive.  Jurisdictions facing 
severe political hurdles to corporate reforms can—and in many cases 
should—adopt a separate legal regime for state-owned firms, along with 
regulatory dualism for private companies. 
This proposal for strict regulatory differentiation, although relatively 
modest in scope and practically attainable, stands in sharp contradiction 
with existing best practices recommendations for SOEs.  Conventional 
wisdom suggests that the same set of laws and regulations should, to the 
greatest degree possible, govern private sector entities and government-
owned firms alike.  For example, the Guidelines on Corporate Governance 
of State-Owned Enterprises of the OECD prescribe that “[w]hen 
streamlining the legal form of SOEs, governments should base themselves 
as much as possible on corporate law and avoid creating a specific legal 
form when this is not absolutely necessary for the objectives of the 
enterprise.”233  Additionally, the Guidelines suggest that “SOEs should be 
subject to the same high quality accounting and auditing standards as listed 
companies” and “[l]arge or listed SOEs should disclose financial and non-
financial information according to high quality internationally recognised 
standards.”234
Interestingly, the main rationale behind this traditional prescription for a 
unitary legal regime to govern public and private firms also lies in the 
state’s conflict of interest as a shareholder and market (rather than corporate 
governance) regulator.  The concern—which is not merely conceptually 
possible, but also corroborated by experience—is that the government will 
try to impose more favorable regulatory standards (for example, in pricing, 
quality, environmental or competition rules) on the firms it owns versus 
those controlled by the private sector.
  
235
With respect to corporate law rules in particular, another justification for 
a unitary legal regime is that the imposition of a private legal regime helps 
enhance efficiency of SOEs by constraining their bureaucrat-managers’ 
  The imposition of a single regime 
on public and private companies alike would prevent the government from 
disadvantaging private firms through special regulatory hurdles that do not 
apply to SOEs, thus assuring the creation of a “level playing field” when 
both types of companies compete in the marketplace. 
 
 233. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES 20 (2005). 
 234. Id. at 43. 
 235. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1713, 1718–20 (2009) (noting 
that SOEs in a variety of countries engage in a variety of anticompetitive behavior that is not 
adequately constrained by existing antitrust laws). 
2012] STATE OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2965 
economic waste and overly politicized decision making.  This line of 
reasoning was made explicit in Brazil in the 1960s, as well as in China in 
connection with its large-scale process of “corporatization” of SOEs in the 
1990s.  As described in greater detail below, the adoption of the same 
corporate laws applicable to private firms is but one technique adopted by 
state-owned enterprises in an attempt to credibly commit to higher 
corporate governance standards.236
But while a unitary corporate law regime may be in the interests of state-
owned enterprises, it may in fact be detrimental to private firms.  Despite 
the looming risk of state abuse, SOEs have a number of advantages over 
private firms in attracting investors.  Mixed enterprises typically enjoy an 
implicit or explicit government guarantee, rendering them effectively 
bankruptcy-proof.  Government-controlled firms are far more common in 
monopolistic industries, whereas private firms often face significant 
competition.  And because they do not enjoy the same degree of 
government support and have fewer rents to distribute, private firms 
arguably have greater need than SOEs of an effective investor protection 
regime in order to attract investors.  A unitary regime, however, is less 
likely to provide an efficient level of investor protection to private firms.
 
237
As this Article illustrates, the government’s dual role as shareholder and 
regulator prevents it from credibly committing not to change its corporate 
law rules in an opportunistic manner in the future if opportunities for profit-
making through expropriation are sufficiently attractive.  Indeed, this risk of 
exploitative policy reversal is precisely the reason why most countries do 
not promulgate the most important limitations to state action via private 
laws, but rather inscribe them in public constitutions that are particularly 
difficult to amend.  Moreover, the net effects of a unitary legal regime may 
actually be detrimental to private companies and their shareholders, since 
the unsuccessful attempts of the state to commit to a private law regime in 
fact undermines the ability of private firms to make a credible commitment 
to investor protection.  As suggested throughout this Article, the state is not 
necessarily constrained by, but rather shapes and constrains, the 
development of corporate laws, with possible negative consequences for the 
corporate governance environment of private firms. 
 
J.P. Morgan Chase’s acquisition of Bear Stearns in 2008 is illustrative of 
how little deference even a democratic and limited government such as that 
of the United States is willing to pay to corporate law rules in carrying out 
its objectives.  In an attempt to ensure completion of the transaction, the 
 
 236. For a statement of the commitment rationale, see OECD, supra note 222, at 12 (“[I]t 
is generally held that the credibility of a commitment to ‘commercial commitment’ in an 
SOE is a function of the degree of which the SOE is made subject to generally applicable 
corporate law.”). 
 237. The proposal for a dual regime thus entails a tradeoff typical of regulatory dualism. 
See Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 88, at 480–81 (“[U]nder regulatory 
dualism, the introduction of the reformist regime may actually cause the established regime 
to become even less efficient than it would be if it were the sole regime, since the reformist 
regime draws off some of the constituency for reform of the established regime.”). 
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merger agreement contemplated a number of deal protection devices—
including a share exchange agreement for 39.5 percent of Bear Stearns’s 
stock—that effectively disenfranchised the target’s shareholders, and, for 
this reason, were unlikely to pass muster under Delaware takeover law.238  
To be sure, the U.S. government was not interested in the transaction as a 
shareholder, but rather as the architect and financier—or “investment 
banker”239
These caveats aside, Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock described the 
position of Delaware courts as “between a rock and a hard place” in facing 
the dilemma between maintaining the integrity of its case law and upsetting 
the interests of the federal government (on whose goodwill the very 
existence of Delaware’s corporate law depends).
—of a deal designed to avoid the macroeconomic crisis that was 
expected to result from the collapse of Bear Stearns.  Moreover, the fact 
that the acquisition took place in the midst of a severe financial crisis, 
whose deleterious economic consequences the deal sought to attenuate, 
makes it difficult to draw reliable generalizations from the developments 
surrounding this specific transaction. 
240  Delaware’s ingenious 
solution was to avoid making a decision altogether by taking advantage of a 
pending lawsuit in New York and deferring the case to its sister court.241
A dual regime for state-owned and private enterprise is not without 
precedent.  State-owned firms around the world are, to varying degrees, 
subject to distinctive rules set forth in special statutes or corporate charters, 
even if regular corporate laws still maintain residual application.  The 
multiplicity of regulatory regimes stemming from different statutory 
charters that derogate general corporate laws has led French jurist George 
Ripert to disparage the existing system of “[u]ne loi par société!”
  
This alternative, while available in the U.S. federalist system, is lacking in 
most other countries.  Hence, the possibility remains that the courts’ 
sympathy to the interests of the government could jeopardize the integrity 
of corporate laws, as ad hoc (and public-interest-inspired) decisions 
favoring the interests of the government as controlling shareholder may set 
the tone for what type of behavior is permissible for controlling 
shareholders generally (both public and private) within a given jurisdiction. 
242
Germany employed a dual approach to appease resistance to investor 
protection improvements.  Local authorities ceased to oppose the enactment 
of a corporate governance law in 1998 when it became clear that their rights 
 
 
 238. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REV. 696, 736 
(2008) (reviewing CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM (2008)) 
(noting that the merger agreement “flouted ordinary Delaware corporate law” and “might 
well have been struck down if the merger did not have the government’s imprimatur”). See 
generally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad 
Law:  Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713 (2009). 
 239. See Skeel, supra note 238, at 733. 
 240. Kahan & Rock, supra note 238, at 713. 
 241. Id. at 715. 
 242. RIPERT, supra note 193, at 317. 
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under a special statute would not be affected by the reform.243  China has 
not only embraced special rules for SASAC, the state holding company that 
serves as the controlling shareholder of SOEs, but there is also growing 
evidence that it may have embraced a dual approach in enforcement, with 
government-owned firms being de facto subject to more lax regulatory 
standards than their private counterparts.244
Adopted by most countries that have recently undertaken large-scale 
privatizations, golden shares provide a more prominent example of a special 
regime applicable only to privatized firms.  Golden shares are essentially a 
special class of stock issued to the privatizing government that grants 
special voting and veto rights that are disproportionate to, or even 
independent of, its cash-flow rights in the company.  In most countries, the 
issuance of golden shares requires the enactment of a special enabling 
statute (often in the form of a separate section of the privatization law), 
which typically specifies that only the state can be a holder of, and exercise 
the rights granted by, these securities.
  Even if these regulatory 
distinctions have earned a bad reputation, additional differentiation in the 
legal regimes applicable to private and government corporations may in fact 
facilitate legal reforms that strengthen the protection of minority investors 
in private sector corporations. 
245  Despite golden shares’ drawbacks 
for corporate decision making and the operation of the market for corporate 
control, a marked advantage of this mechanism is that it addresses the 
government’s interests while keeping the legal regime applicable to private 
firms intact—and is therefore a more attractive alternative to a single 
regime molded by the state’s interests.246
Moreover, the current legal system in the United States to some extent 
already provides such a dual regime, and has come under sharp criticism for 
precisely that reason.  Legal scholars have recently condemned the failure 
of U.S. law to afford the same minority protections to shareholders of 
private and government-controlled companies, with the latter being 
comparatively disadvantaged.
 
247  In testimony before Congress, J.W. Verret 
remarked that “[g]overnment shareholders don’t have to play by the same 
rules as the rest of us, a fact which will strain the governance mechanisms 
of the capital markets at a time when they are already in crisis.”248
 
 243. See supra notes 
  For 
187–89 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 156–62 and accompanying text.  China’s lesser deference to the rule 
of law may partly explain the particular success of a dual enforcement strategy in the 
country. 
 245. See Grundmann & Möslein, supra note 214, at 2–3. 
 246. Nevertheless, the European Court of Justice has closely scrutinized golden shares 
and special state voting rights and impermissible restrictions to its common market. See 
supra note 189. 
 247. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1317–19, 1363; Verret, supra note 4, at 
286–89. 
 248. The U.S. Government as Dominant Shareholder:  How Should Taxpayers’ 
Ownership Rights Be Exercised?  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the 
House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of J. W. Verret, 
Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law). 
2968 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
instance, existing doctrines of sovereign immunity severely restrict suits 
against the government for breaches of fiduciary duties of controlling 
shareholders, and the U.S. government is expressly exempted from insider 
trading laws.249  Moreover, the securities of government-sponsored 
enterprises are generally exempt from federal securities laws and the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) more 
generally, despite official calls for a unitary regime.250
This Article suggests that such criticism of the existing duality of legal 
regimes is unwarranted once the political economy component of corporate 
lawmaking is taken into account.  Perhaps counterintuitively, the award of a 
different treatment to outside shareholders of state-controlled corporations 
can in fact permit the provision of greater protection of minority investors 
in private firms.  This line of reasoning strongly favors the adoption of a 
separate regulatory regime applicable only to state-owned firms. 
 
2.  Dual Regulatory Authorities 
When the creation of a dual regime is driven by political considerations, 
the adoption of a dualist regulatory structure by a single regulatory 
authority faces practical hurdles.251  Apart from possible difficulties 
associated with the implementation and administration of different 
standards within a single jurisdiction, the risk exists that the same political 
constituency that blocks the establishment of a single efficient legal regime 
will stymie the creation of a dual regime.252
a.  Dual Regulatory Authorities Within the Same State 
  This section explores the 
potential of a split in regulatory authorities to address the conflicts of 
interest inherent in the state’s dual role as shareholder and regulator. 
Unlike the proposal for a different legal regime for state-owned and 
private firms discussed above, which conflicts with conventional best 
practices recommendations, the proposal for a separation of regulatory 
authorities within a given jurisdiction is standard in the literature.  The 
OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance on State-Owned Enterprises 
defend a “strict separation of the state’s ownership and regulatory 
functions” as a “fundamental prerequisite for creating a level playing field 
for SOEs and private companies and for avoiding distortion of 
competition.”253
 
 249. Id. 
  Consistent with these recommendations, France 
 250. See STANTON, supra note 31, at 23.  For a report of three major government agencies 
calling for the elimination of such exemptions, see DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SEC & BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., JOINT REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 
MARKET, at xvi (1992) (“The Agencies support legislation removing the exemptions from 
the federal securities laws for equity and unsecured debt securities of Government-sponsored 
enterprises (‘GSEs’), which would require GSEs to register such securities with the SEC.”). 
 251. See generally Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 88. 
 252. Id. 
 253. OECD, supra note 233, at 3, 18. 
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established a Government Shareholding Agency in 2004 to represent the 
interests of the state as a corporate shareholder (l’État actionnaire) while 
leaving independent the government’s regulatory function.254  Similarly, 
the U.S. Treasury’s controlling stake in AIG is held by a trust (of which the 
Treasury is the sole beneficiary) in an attempt to avoid political interference 
in the trust’s (and, therefore, the company’s) management.255
The effectiveness of the separation of the public agencies responsible for 
managing the government’s equity holdings and agencies responsible for 
regulating the industry remains an open question.  This Article suggests that 
recommendations for institutional separation within the same jurisdiction as 
a solution to conflicts in corporate governance regulation should be taken 
with a grain of salt.  In virtually all cases of conflicts of interest in corporate 
law reforms analyzed throughout this Article, an institutional separation 
between the public body in charge of elaborating corporate laws (usually 
Congress or courts) and those responsible for managing the enterprise (the 
executive branch) was already in place, but this institutional separation was 
insufficient to eliminate the state’s conflicts of interest and influence over 
the legal regime. 
 
b.  Federalism 
In addition to separate public agencies, federalism provides another way 
to quarantine a government’s lawmaking from its ownership function.  In 
Germany and Brazil, corporate law is generally federal (national) law even 
though at least some state enterprises belong to state (sub-national) 
governments.  By contrast, in the early twentieth-century United States, 
federally owned corporations were habitually chartered under state laws.256
The federal solution may therefore be helpful in reducing conflicts of 
interest in corporate lawmaking.  In addition to splitting the state’s 
ownership and regulatory functions, decentralized power necessarily limits 
what politicians can sell in a corrupt or corruptible system.
 
257
 
 254. For a detailed description, see The Missions of the Government Shareholding Agency 
(APE), AGENCE DES PARTICIPATIONS DE L’ETAT, http://www.ape.minefi.gouv.fr/sections/qu_
est_ce_que_l_ape/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
  
Nevertheless, this approach is not free from difficulties.  State interests 
often play a prominent role in federal lawmaking.  A case in point is the 
significant (and successful) opposition of German state governments to a 
1998 federal corporate law reform mandating a one-share, one-vote rule, 
which would have impaired the states’ prior influence in portfolio firms 
 255. See AIG, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3 (Feb. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.aigcorporate.com/investors/2654275_15501T04_CNB.pdf. 
 256. See Pritchett, supra note 29, at 508. 
 257. For a version of this argument, see Edward B. Rock, Encountering the Scarlet 
Woman of Wall Street:  Speculative Comments at the End of the Century, 2 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 237, 261–63 (2001) (describing how the existence of overlapping corrupt 
sovereigns undermined the stability of corrupt legal outcomes in the nineteenth-century 
United States). 
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through veto rights and voting caps.258  Moreover, this type of duality has 
been partially outlawed in the United States, as the Government 
Corporation Control Act of 1945 restricted what it saw as the “anomaly” of 
using state charters for the creation of federal corporations, requiring a 
specific act of Congress for their establishment.259
c.  Private and Public Regulatory Authorities Within the Same State 
 
Another possibility is to have a dual regulatory regime imposed by a 
private regulatory authority.  As described in greater detail elsewhere, 
Brazil’s Novo Mercado, a voluntary listing standard of the São Paulo Stock 
Exchange providing for more stringent corporate governance standards than 
those required under Brazilian law, provides precisely such an example.260
Brazilian SOEs began to take advantage of domestic bonding 
opportunities through the Novo Mercado soon after they became available.  
Sabesp, a sewage company that had been wholly owned by the São Paulo 
state government, was the second firm to pursue a listing on the Novo 
Mercado.
  
However, as a paradigmatic example of regulatory dualism, the Novo 
Mercado does not differentiate between the regime applicable to private 
firms on the one hand, and state-owned enterprises on the other.  On the 
contrary, the Novo Mercado explicitly welcomed listings of state-owned 
and recently privatized firms. 
261  Sabesp’s IPO was coupled with the issuance of American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in the United States, where most of the 
company’s public float is now traded.  It is telling that the offerings were 
not driven by capital raising considerations, since all of its traded stock was 
the product of secondary offerings.  Instead, the incumbent government’s 
motivation behind the listing was to achieve greater efficiency in the 
company’s management and to render it immune from future political 
interference.262
Nevertheless, the state’s attempts to make a credible commitment to 
higher corporate governance standards by subjecting its controlled firms to 
a private law regime are not bulletproof.  The danger remains that the 
presence of the government as a shareholder may eventually undermine the 
Novo Mercado’s stricter investor protection standards.  The recent attempt 
by the BM&F Bovespa to revise the Novo Mercado listing rules in order to 
  Since Sabesp’s offering in 2002, other SOEs and recently 
privatized firms have embraced a Novo Mercado listing.  In 2006, 
government-controlled banking giant Banco do Brasil restructured its 
capital structure to convert its preferred non-voting stock into voting 
common stock in order to become eligible for a Novo Mercado listing. 
 
 258. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 259. See Pritchett, supra note 29, at 508. 
 260. Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 88, at 482–501. 
 261. See Corporate Governance Reform Activities in Brazil and IFC Support:  Timeline 
of Events Through 2006, in FOCUS:  NOVO MERCADO AND ITS FOLLOWERS:  CASE STUDIES IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM, supra note 109, at 37, 38. 
 262. See generally Kenyon, supra note 122. 
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provide for even stricter corporate governance standards met with resistance 
by existing firms listed on the exchange, which vetoed the most ambitious 
proposals.263  The three state-controlled firms listed on the Novo Mercado 
were among the companies that voted against some of the proposed 
revisions, such as the creation of a mandatory audit committee, the 
imposition of a mandatory bid rule triggered upon the acquisition of 30 
percent of the firm’s stock, and an increase in the minimum proportion of 
independent directors from 20 to 30 percent of the company’s board.264
Moreover, the exchange’s private regulations do not eliminate the state’s 
extra role as a regulator.  Any private regulatory regime depends on the 
state’s regulatory acquiescence and contractual enforcement.  In Brazil, as 
in the United States, stock exchange regulations are not immune from legal 
and political interference.  The issuance of Novo Mercado regulations 
requires the approval of Brazil’s Securities and Exchange Commission, just 
as changes to the New York Stock Exchange rules require prior U.S. SEC 
approval.  Consequently, the risk persists that the interests of the 
government as a shareholder may come to hamper the revision of Novo 
Mercado’s listing standards over time. 
 
d.  Dualism Across Different Jurisdictions 
More promising than the split of regulatory authorities within a single 
jurisdiction is the attempt of listed SOEs to subject themselves to regulatory 
and enforcement action by a different state or an international institution.  
Outsourcing of enforcement of state legal obligations is now a conventional 
mechanism by which national governments can tie their hands and therefore 
credibly commit not to expropriate foreign investors through abusive policy 
reversals.  To encourage foreign direct investment, governments typically 
enter into such commitments by signing bilateral investment treaties 
providing for international arbitration to resolve disputes.265
State-owned enterprises, in turn, have resorted to a dual regulatory 
approach across different jurisdictions by cross-listing and issuing ADRs in 
foreign jurisdictions.  Perhaps surprisingly, state-owned corporations are 
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more likely than family-controlled firms to cross-list or issue ADRs 
abroad266—a decision that a significant strand of the literature attributes to 
the desire to lower their cost of capital by “bonding” to higher corporate 
governance standards than those available in their home countries.267
Nevertheless, while cross-listing may be a promising approach to deal 
with states’ conflicts of interest in SOEs, it is not without challenges.
  
According to the “bonding hypothesis,” a cross-listing helps firms from 
countries offering low investor protections to credibly commit to protecting 
investors by piggybacking onto more protective NYSE corporate 
governance standards.  This Article suggests that the particular 
susceptibility of state-owned firms to governmental conflicts of interest in 
the enforcement of investor protections may help explain why SOEs are 
more likely than private firms to cross-list their shares in foreign markets, 
particularly in the United States. 
268  
First, securities regulations applicable to foreign issuers are significantly 
more lenient than those applicable to domestic firms.269  Second, there is 
evidence that the SEC tends to be more forgiving of, and therefore brings 
fewer claims against, foreign issuers, thus further undermining the 
effectiveness of a bonding strategy.270
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all things being equal, the SEC may be more willing to file enforcement 
actions against private firms than government-controlled firms so as to 
avoid diplomatic tensions.  Consequently, the risk of a reverse bonding 
strategy persists, in which “weak corporate governance practices of the 
home country are exported to the foreign listing environment.”271
CONCLUSION 
 
To the extent that the world’s largest firms have controlling shareholders, 
they are all too often states rather than individuals, families, or financial 
institutions.  Despite several waves of privatization, state ownership 
remains pervasive around the globe.  Corporations that are government 
controlled and publicly traded account for a sizable (and growing) fraction 
of the market capitalization in numerous jurisdictions, particularly in 
emerging markets. 
But despite their economic significance and legal complexity, SOEs 
remain surprisingly understudied.  The existing literature has all but 
neglected the political economy implications of state ownership for the 
content of a country’s corporate laws in general and for its level of investor 
protection in particular.  Yet, as this Article demonstrates, the conflicts of 
interest inherent in the state’s dual role as a player and referee are both 
evident and enduring, and manifest themselves in a variety of historical and 
institutional contexts.  I suggest that this mechanism may account for an 
overlooked channel for reverse causation in the relationship between legal 
investor protection and ownership structure:  while a deficient legal regime 
and underdeveloped capital markets may prompt the state to assume an 
entrepreneurial function, the political role of the state as controlling 
shareholder may, in turn, hinder the development of an effective investor 
protection regime as a precondition for further financial development. 
This Article represents an initial attempt to illustrate and address this 
problem.  The conflicts of interest stemming from the state’s two roles, 
although serious, are hardly sufficient to condemn government ownership 
of enterprise.  Alternative institutional arrangements, ranging from different 
ownership structures to dual regulatory systems, can be used to mitigate the 
state’s interest in the design and enforcement of corporate law rules 
applicable to private firms.  State ownership is not going away and, absent 
institutional innovations, neither are the government’s conflicts of interest 
as a corporate governance regulator. 
 
 
 271. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 238, 134 (2008) (describing the case of China 
Aviation Oil, a Chinese company with tight links to the state that was cross-listed in 
Singapore). 
